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ABSTRACT—Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the 
assumption that statutes have linguistic meanings that we can identify in the 
same way that we identify the meaning of utterances in ordinary 
conversation. But that premise is false. We identify the meaning of 
conversational utterances largely based on inferences about what the speaker 
intended to communicate. With legislatures, as now is widely recognized, 
there is no unitary speaker with the sort of communicative intentions that 
speakers in ordinary conversation possess. One might expect this recognition 
to trigger abandonment of the model of conversational interpretation as a 
framework for interpreting statutes. Instead, interpreters invent legislative 
intentions—purportedly “objective” ones for textualists—or purposes. With 
those inventions in place, judges and theorists then carry on talking about 
what statutes mean, or would mean to a reasonable person, as if there were a 
linguistic fact of the matter even in intelligibly disputed cases. But this is a 
deep and systematic error. 
Mainstream thinking about statutory interpretation needs a major 
reorientation. Contrary to widespread impressions, debates about statutory 
interpretation are not about what statutes mean as a matter of linguistic fact, 
but about which grounds for the attribution of an invented meaning would 
best promote judicial and governmental legitimacy. Having recognized that 
the model of conversational interpretation cannot ground claims about 
statutes’ meanings in disputed cases, we also need to rethink the role of 
legislatures and courts in a political democracy. There are limits to what 
legislatures can reasonably be expected to accomplish. Courts need to play 
the role of helpmates to the legislature, not just faithful agents. In the 
interpretation of statutes, linguistic intuitions should matter, but primarily for 
normative reasons, involving justice and fairness in the coercive application 
of law, and not because they reveal the legislature’s linguistically clear 
dictates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia said in his Tanner Lectures that it was disheartening to 
think we have no agreed theory of statutory interpretation.1 Though Justice 
 
 1 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (endorsing the assertion of HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) that “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that 
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Kagan has subsequently asserted that “we’re all textualists now,”2 Justice 
Scalia remains fundamentally correct: no agreement on interpretive 
methodology has yet emerged. The explanation resides in a premise that 
undergirds nearly all claims about statutes’ meanings and similarly underlies 
nearly all interpretive theories. This is the premise that statutes have 
linguistic meanings that we can reliably ascertain in roughly the same way 
we determine the meaning of utterances in ordinary conversation.3 That 
premise is almost always false in contested cases. My central ambitions in 
this paper are to establish both the pervasiveness of that premise and its 
falsity, and to trace the resulting implications. 
My analytical starting point lies in the concept of legislative intent. If 
we ask why anyone might think that legislative intent matters to statutory 
interpretation, the answer involves a commitment to the techniques we 
employ to identify the meaning of utterances in ordinary conversation.4 
I use the term “utterances” advisedly. Philosophers of language 
distinguish between “sentence meaning” and “utterance meaning.”5 Within 
 
American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory 
interpretation” and adding that “this is a sad commentary”). 
 2 Harvard Law School, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of 
Statutes at 8:29 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-
statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]. 
 3 This premise is shared not only by judges, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, but also by nearly all legal 
theorists and many philosophers of language. See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? 
Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 218–19 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (citing examples); 
SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special About the Law, in 
1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS AND HOW WE USE IT 403, 403 
(2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts] (arguing that “[p]rogress can . . . be made . . . by 
seeing [legal and statutory interpretation] as an instance of the more general question of what determines 
the contents of ordinary linguistic texts”). 
 4 See, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 12 (2014) (“The . . . ‘standard’ view that I 
strive to defend . . . can be stated as follows: the collective action of the legislators enacting a law is a 
collective speech act, whereby some content is communicated that is, essentially, the content of the law 
voted on.”); Scott Soames, Deferentialism, Living Originalism, and the Constitution, in THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM 
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 218, 218 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) [hereinafter Soames, Living 
Originalism] (“The legal content of a statute . . . can be identified with what was said, asserted, or 
stipulated by lawmakers or ratifiers in passing or approving it.”); Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How 
Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 984 (2017) (endorsing “the ‘conversation’ model of 
interpretation”). 
 5 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 18 (1983) (“The distinction between sentence and 
utterance is of fundamental importance to both semantics and pragmatics.”); Scott Soames, Toward a 
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 231, 236 (2011) [hereinafter Soames, Toward 
a Theory] (“Contemporary philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics distinguish the meaning of 
a sentence S from its semantic content relative to a context, both of which are distinguished from (the 
content of) what is said, asserted, or stipulated by an utterance of S.”); see also MARMOR, supra note 4, 
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the terms of that distinction, the meanings of sentences do not vary from one 
context to another. Sentence meaning is “semantic meaning,” defined largely 
by the definitions of words and the rules of syntax and grammar. By contrast, 
the communicative contents of different utterances of a sentence can vary 
greatly. “Alex was a big help” may refer to different people named Alex and, 
in context, may implicitly signal where, how, and with what Alex was 
helpful. To use just a bit more philosophical jargon, the movement from 
sentence meaning to utterance meaning occurs via a process of “pragmatic 
enrichment” in which both speakers and listeners rely on contextual factors 
to supplement semantic meanings.6 There is much dispute about how to draw 
the line between semantic meaning and pragmatic enrichment.7 But there is 
little dispute that pragmatic enrichment matters crucially to utterance 
meaning and that it depends, in one way or another, on the communicative 
intentions of speakers against the background of intersubjectively shared, but 
typically unarticulated, assumptions of speakers and listeners.8 
In the example of “Alex was a big help,” unstated assumptions and a 
speaker’s communicative intentions can mean everything. On some 
occasions, the utterance of that sentence might be, and might properly be 
understood as being, ironic. If so, its communicative content—or, as I shall 
say, its meaning—would be that Alex was no help at all. In referring to 
“meaning” here, I need to be precise about terminology. Throughout this 
Article, unless I expressly indicate otherwise, I use the term “meaning” to 
refer to what philosophers of language more commonly call the 
“communicative content” of an utterance, or what an utterance asserts or 
stipulates.9 The term “meaning” can properly be used differently and more 
 
at 23 (positing that “semantic properties are properties of words and sentences, not of utterances or speech 
acts”). 
 6 See, e.g., PATRICK GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 21 
(2006) (contrasting “[s]emantics,” which “is the study of context-independent knowledge that users of a 
language have of word and sentence meaning,” with pragmatics, which is concerned with the meaning of 
words and sentences in context); MARMOR, supra note 4, at 22–27; SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts, 
supra note 3, at 404 (“Typically, an agent produces a sentence in a context with a communicative goal 
and topic, a record of what has been supposed or established up to then, and assumptions about the beliefs 
and intentions of the participants. This pragmatic information interacts with the semantic content of the 
sentence to add content to the discourse.”). For a well-known but controversial account of the 
unselfconscious, psychological processes through which pragmatic enrichment occurs, see DAN SPERBER 
& DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 118–71 (2d ed. 1995). 
 7 See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 5, at 22–25. 
 8 See SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts, supra note 3, at 403; Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative 
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 488 (2013) (“In the philosophy of language 
and theoretical linguistics, the phrase ‘pragmatic enrichment’ is sometimes used to refer to the 
contribution that context makes to meaning.”). 
 9 See Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 598 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, A Post-Originalist Theory] (“[W]hat is 
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capaciously, both in ordinary language and in law, to include, for example, 
sentence meaning or the proper application of an instruction or a statute in 
light of nonlinguistic considerations.10 Putting other possible usages to one 
side, I am concerned, for now, solely with the content that specific utterances 
convey at the time of their utterance. 
One more example may further illuminate the way in which 
conversational utterances can convey less, as well as more, than the literal 
meanings of the sentences that are spoken. Imagine two parents discussing 
appropriate discipline for a child who has misbehaved:11 
A: So we agree that we will tell Carol, “You are grounded for two 
weeks because of what you did.” 
B: Yes, after school, she has to be in the house unless she is 
participating in a school activity. 
A: Or unless she is going to church or music lessons or is with one 
of us. 
B: Of course. 
Now imagine that the above conversation had stopped after the initial 
utterances by A and B, with no reference to whether the agreement to ground 
Carol bars her from going to church or a music lesson. And further imagine 
that when either A or B recites the agreement to Carol, Carol asks whether 
her punishment precludes her participation in those activities. What ought A 
or B to say if the other is not there? In light of B’s “Of course,” I would 
conclude that assumptions about church, music lessons, and activities with a 
parent are part of the interpretive common ground—the background of 
unstated assumptions—existing between A and B and, thus, contribute to the 
communicative content of their utterances to one another. 
Although lawyers rarely follow philosophers in using the terms 
“sentence meaning” and “utterance meaning,” they routinely draw a closely 
analogous distinction when they differentiate between a statutory provision’s 
literal meaning and its meaning “in context.”12 At one time, statutory 
 
asserted or stipulated can usually be identified with what the speaker means and what hearers take the 
speaker to mean by the words used on [a particular] occasion.”); Solum, supra note 8, at 480 (“The phrase 
‘communicative content’ is simply a precise way of labeling what we usually call the ‘meaning’ or 
‘linguistic meaning’ of the text.”). 
 10 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of 
Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1243–52 (2015) (distinguishing multiple senses of legal 
meaning, including semantic or literal meaning, contextual meaning, intended real conceptual meaning, 
reasonable meaning, and interpreted meaning). 
 11 I am indebted to Mark Richard for suggesting this example. 
 12 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 8, at 487–94 (discussing literal meaning in law). 
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interpretation debates included adherents to a “plain meaning” school.13 To 
a reasonable approximation, the plain meaning school equated statutory 
meaning with sentence meaning.14 Today, however, nearly all participants in 
statutory interpretation debates accept that meaning depends on context.15 
And if we apply what I shall call the model of conversational interpretation 
to interpret statutes, then contextual meaning would appear to be the 
equivalent of utterance meaning—what a reasonable person would take a 
statutory provision to mean as uttered by a particular person on a particular 
occasion. If so, the analogy of the exchange between Carol’s parents would 
suggest that statutes might mean more, less, or something different from 
what they literally say. The analogy might also help to illuminate nonliteral 
interpretations of statutes in some cases, including those in which courts 
sometimes read statutes as having unstated exceptions16 or as “preempting” 
 
 13 For a discussion of the plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation, see generally Frederick 
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning,  
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231 (1991). 
 14 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2456 (2003) [hereinafter 
Manning, Absurdity] (“In contrast with their literalist predecessors in the ‘plain meaning’ school, modern 
textualists reject the idea that interpretation can occur ‘within the four corners’ of a statute.” (quoting 
White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551 (1903))); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from 
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79 & n.28 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (stating 
the same). 
 15 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) (“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at 
the time they were written.”); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 14, at 2392–93; Manning, What Divides, 
supra note 14, at 91 (noting that textualists and purposivists both stress the importance of contexts but 
maintaining that “[t]extualists give primacy to the semantic context—evidence about the way a reasonable 
person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have used the words,” while 
“[p]urposivists give precedence to policy context—evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person 
conversant with the circumstances underlying enactment would suppress the mischief and advance the 
remedy”). 
 16 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized a myriad of nontextual exceptions to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
685, 719–24 (2014). In doing so Justices who characterize themselves as textualists have frequently, but 
not invariably, relied on the common law background against which § 1983 was enacted. See id. Lacking 
a common law background on which to rely, in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, the textualist Justice Clarence Thomas, in a majority opinion joined by Justice Scalia, 
reasoned that historical practice supported a “presumption that federal law generally will not interfere 
with administration of state taxes” and held on that basis that “Congress did not authorize injunctive or 
declaratory relief under § 1983 in state tax cases . . . .” Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995).  
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other laws that previously regulated the same subject.17 
But when we move from conversational to statutory interpretation, a 
disparity stands out. Utterances in ordinary conversation have speakers or 
authors whose communicative intentions and assumptions matter crucially 
in determining what those utterances mean. Indeed, among philosophers of 
language, the central debate is not so much about whether speakers’ 
intentions matter to utterance meaning as about how they matter.18 With 
regard to statutes, by contrast, leading participants in debates about 
interpretation agree that the legislature typically has no shared, collective, or 
institutional intent to communicate a particular “meaning” in the way, for 
example, that one friend might if she said to another, “Alex was a big help,” 
or if one of a child’s parents said, “So we agree that we will tell Carol, ‘You 
are grounded for two weeks because of what you did.’” 
As is now widely recognized by textualists and purposivists alike, 
American legislatures are not the kinds of entities capable of having 
collective communicative intentions in the same rich, psychological sense as 
individuals.19 Moreover, although members of an enacting majority may 
individually have communicative intentions in that rich, psychological 
sense, it is improbable that their individual intentions would converge 
exactly with regard to disputed provisions. At least in cases involving 
complex legislation, different legislators may aim to cause readers or 
listeners to come to different beliefs about the communicative content of 
contestable provisions. And some legislators may not even have read the 
disputed provisions themselves. If not, they may have no specific 
communicative intentions of their own. 
With both textualists and purposivists agreeing that the legislature 
typically lacks collective communicative intent in the same rich, 
psychological sense as an individual speaker or author, one might also expect 
both to concur in rejecting the model of conversational interpretation.20 
Remarkably, however, neither textualists nor purposivists have done so. 
Instead, in response to the absence of an actual intent of the legislature to 
 
 17 See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (articulating a standard under which 
federal law will be held impliedly to preempt state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941))). 
 18 See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 
2405–12 (2017) [hereinafter Manning, Without the Pretense] (endorsing this position and cataloguing 
myriad luminaries in the theory of statutory interpretation who have concurred). 
 20 For a powerful argument that it should, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 51–55, 313–37 
(1986). For discussion of how Dworkin’s theory of law and interpretation relate to my argument in this 
Article, see infra Section III.D. 
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communicate particular meanings, the most familiar response has been to 
invent a substitute that enables continued reliance on the model of 
conversational interpretation, as duly amended. For the psychological intent 
of the legislature, textualists propose to substitute an “objective” intent.21 
Purposivists advocate reliance on legislative “purposes” as ascribed by 
courts rather than on actual, subjective speakers’ intentions.22 
But efforts to invent a substitute for legislative intent, understood as a 
psychological intent to communicate a particular meaning, are muddled. 
This is my first, central, anchoring claim in this Article, introduced here and 
further supported in Part I. If we accept that speakers’ intentions need to be 
invented, it follows that a statute’s meaning—if it is to be a function of an 
invented substitute for speakers’ intent—will be an invention, too. We 
cannot both invent a determinant of statutes’ meanings and claim to have 
discovered what statutes “really” mean as a matter of linguistic fact, at least 
in reasonably contestable cases—a qualification I shall explain shortly. 
Textualists, in particular, are prone to overlook the implications of their 
own arguments that legislatures lack communicative intentions in the sense 
in which ordinary speakers have them. Falling into a muddle on this point, 
textualists are partly the victims of their own ingenuity in seeking to give 
content to the idea of “objective” legislative intent. Textualists 
characteristically equate the objective intent of the legislature with an intent 
to communicate whatever a reasonable listener would understand a statutory 
provision to mean. For reasons I shall explain, this strategy succeeds insofar, 
but only insofar, as it involves the positing of what I shall call the “minimal” 
communicative intentions that would be necessary to make a statute 
 
 21 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 17 (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus 
juris.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 423 (2005) [hereinafter 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent] (“[T]extualists have sought to devise a constructive intent 
that satisfies the minimum conditions for meaningfully tracing statutory meaning to the legislative 
process.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353–57 (2005). In a more recent 
article, Dean Manning proposes to abandon even the idea of an “objective” legislative intent, see 
Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19, at 2421–27, but continues to rely on the model of 
conversational interpretation to determine what a “reasonable person” would understand legislative 
language to mean—even though a reasonable listener’s capacity to grasp the meaning of utterances in 
ordinary conversation depends on assumptions about or ascriptions of speakers’ intentions. See infra 
notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 22 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1374 (urging interpreters to “[d]ecide what purpose 
ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved” on the 
assumption that the legislature consisted of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably” and to “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the 
purpose” as well as possible). There is an important conceptual difference between statutory purposes in 
this sense and the specific communicative intentions of the enacting legislature. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, 
Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370–71 (1947); Manning, 
Without the Pretense, supra note 19. 
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intelligible in its linguistic, historical, and institutional context.23 These 
would include such intentions as to legislate, in English, and to convey 
whatever a reasonable listener would necessarily understand the words of a 
statute to require, provide, or stipulate. 
But an objective legislative intent, in this minimal sense, is not much 
richer than an intent to utter a meaningful sentence with legal consequences 
of some kind. Knowing the speaker had this kind of minimal intention—
necessarily held by anyone who uttered words in a linguistic, historical, and 
institutional context—would not have told us whether Carol’s grounding by 
her parents barred her from attending church or music lessons. Nor would a 
minimal intention, in the sense defined, help with reasonably disputable 
cases such as those that currently perplex the courts. It would not tell us, for 
example, whether a federal statute includes implicit exceptions, analogous to 
those in Carol’s case, or preempts state statutes regulating the same 
activities. 
Smith v. United States,24 which divided the Justices of the Supreme 
Court and has subsequently divided theorists,25 illustrates the same point. 
Smith posed the question whether a provision that enhanced the criminal 
penalty for anyone who “uses” a firearm in connection with drug trafficking 
applied to a defendant who had traded a gun for drugs. Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor held that the statute applied. A person who trades 
a gun for drugs “uses” a gun in the literal sense, she emphasized.26 Moreover, 
it is surely intelligible that a legislator establishing the penalty enhancement 
might have intended the statute to apply. Justice Scalia dissented. He thought 
that a speaker using the relevant words and a listener hearing them would 
much more probably understand the phrase “use a firearm” as meaning “use 
a firearm as a weapon.”27 
 
 23 This usage echoes JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE 
THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 284–85 (2009) (positing that legislators should be assumed 
to vote for legislation with the “minimal intention” to make law that will be “understood” in accordance 
with the norms of “their legal culture”). For discussion of the limits of Raz’s notion of minimal intent, 
see infra note 83. 
 24 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 25 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 88 (2d ed. 2018) 
(praising the majority’s analytical approach); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110–11 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute] (arguing that “the 
Smith dissent arrived at a more plausible conclusion” than would a literal reading of the statute and 
commending that “more contextual approach” to textualists); Soames, Toward a Theory, supra note 5, at 
237–41 (critiquing the conflation of the meaning of a sentence with what the sentence was used to assert 
in Justice Scalia’s “otherwise brilliant dissent”). 
 26 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228–29. 
 27 See id. at 241–43. 
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Suppose we agree that Justice Scalia was correct about most typical 
usages, perhaps as revealed by corpus linguistic analysis.28 Even if so, it 
would not follow that a speaker using the statutory language would 
necessarily have intended to communicate the more restricted message. As 
corpus linguistic research recurrently teaches, the most common uses of 
words or phrases are typically not the only, or the only linguistically eligible, 
ones.29 More examples would amplify, not limit, the central conclusion to be 
drawn: to generate determinate answers in cases such as Smith, textualists 
must posit more than necessarily inferable or minimal speakers’ intentions. 
To resolve disputed cases, textualists must fill up the underdeterminate 
vessel of “objective” legislative intent—as Justice Scalia sought to do in 
Smith—with contestable content (or take similar steps to specify the 
assumptions of the “reasonable” reader in whose judgments they seek to 
ground the idea of an objective legislative intent). It is not an adequate 
answer to maintain, as some theorists do, that the law renders determinate 
what linguistic meaning leaves unresolved.30 Although I shall say a good deal 
more about this point below, it should suffice for now to recall the complaint 
by Justice Scalia with which I began: to date, the law has failed to develop 
agreed, determinate methods of statutory interpretation. 
Building on this argument, this Article advances a second strong claim: 
the real fight in statutory interpretation debates is less about linguistics than 
about which normative criteria should guide the construction of the fictitious 
objective intent or legislative purpose that will help determine interpretive 
outcomes. More specifically, the deep dispute between textualists and 
purposivists involves questions of moral and political legitimacy. 
Purposivists emphasize the importance of justice and good government—as 
measured from the perspective of reasonable people concerned to achieve 
reasonable aims through reasonable means—as a source of interpretive 
legitimacy.31 By contrast, textualists protest that purposivist interpretation 
risks the substitution of judicial for legislative judgment in contravention of 
democratic norms.32 In taking this stance, textualists prioritize democracy 
 
 28 Corpus linguistic analysis relies on large databases made up of naturally occurring usages in 
newspapers, books, websites, and the like to identify the most common uses of words or phrases. See, 
e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 833–51, 
859–64 (2018). 
 29 See id. 
 30 See infra Section II.A. 
 31 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013) (defending 
purposivism as necessary to “the task of fashioning a workable legal system”). 
 32 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the 
self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their 
own objectives and desires . . . .”). 
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over substantive justice and reasonableness as a source of interpretive 
legitimacy. 
Against the background of legal disagreement and confusion, my third 
central claim addresses an aspect of the debate between textualists and 
purposivists that neither, understandably, like to dwell on. Until substantive 
content is ascribed to the ideas of “objective intent”—in the case of 
textualism—and more is said about how courts should ascribe “reasonable” 
purposes to the legislature—in the case of purposivism—one cannot 
meaningfully compare the merits of interpretive textualism, trumpeted as a 
theory to advance democracy and democratic legitimacy, with those of 
purposivism, touted as a promoter of good government. To run this 
comparison, one would need to know the outcomes that the theories would 
generate. At the very least, one would need to know what purportedly 
“objective” intentions textualists would ascribe and, absent linguistic 
necessity, on what basis they would make their ascriptions. At the present 
time, textualists tend to be disproportionately conservative and purposivists 
more characteristically liberal.33 If we assume these pairings to be stable 
(even if they are contingent rather than necessary), then conservative 
textualists—whose conservatism will inexorably shine through in the way 
they invent the intent that textualism then purports to reveal—need to defend 
their conservatism as much their textualism. By the same token, liberal 
purposivists have to defend their liberalism in imputing purposes to the 
legislature. 
Following my critique of the model of conversational interpretation as 
a muddled foundation for claims about statutory meaning in disputed cases, 
this Article turns from debunking to prescription. Focus on the necessarily 
normative dimension of statutory interpretation in cases in which linguistic 
meaning is underdeterminate casts the connection between legal 
interpretation and linguistic interpretation in a new light, but, it does not 
imply that no such connection exists, even in reasonably disputable cases 
such as Smith. Although it is error to believe statutes’ meanings can be 
grounded in the model of conversational interpretation, it would be an 
equally deep mistake to conclude that the role of judges in interpreting 
statutes could be untethered from the ways in which ordinary people use and 
understand language. I would conjecture that ordinary people, unschooled in 
 
 33 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Book Review, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 849, 906–07 (2013) (noting that “[i]nterpretive theories like textualism and purposivism 
have become political brands, marking judges as conservatives or liberals,” and explaining that although 
textualism is not “hard-wired to produce conservative results,” “[t]o deny the political nature of 
contemporary textualism is to blink reality”); Caleb Nelson, supra note 21, at 373 (noting that “today’s 
textualists tend to be politically conservative”). 
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either law or linguistic theory, are as prone as judges and lawyers to think 
that they can generally understand statutes in roughly the same way that they 
interpret utterances in daily conversation. Encountering a statute that makes 
it an offense to drive an unregistered motor vehicle, a person of ordinary 
intelligence concludes unhesitatingly that it is a punishable offense to drive 
an unregistered motor vehicle, without anxiety about how to assign linguistic 
meaning to a speaker-less utterance. Nor does that confidence dissolve in 
debated cases, such as Smith, in which even as sophisticated a user of 
language as Justice Scalia insisted that the statute’s meaning and application 
could be resolved as a matter of linguistic fact. 
Having advanced this conjecture about ordinary citizens’ confident 
apprehension of statutes’ meanings, this Article links linguistic analysis to 
normative political theory. Within the domain of linguistic theory, I develop 
a distinction between linguistic intuitions about statutes’ meanings and well-
grounded linguistic judgments. In my usage, intuitions are immediate, 
untheorized, provisional beliefs. By contrast, judgments are rooted in and 
claim validation by articulable frameworks or theories. As theorized within 
the model of conversational interpretation, well-grounded linguistic 
judgments depend on speakers’ communicative intentions and speakers’ and 
listeners’ assumptions about interpretive common ground. It is vital to 
recognize, however, that the absence of individual speakers with rich, 
psychological communicative intentions in statutory interpretation cases 
frequently does not undercut our linguistic intuitions about statutes’ 
meanings, even in the recognized absence of a theoretically satisfactory 
foundation for those intuitions. 
For normative rather than linguistic reasons, I argue, the law should 
accord significant weight to linguistic intuitions, with the significance 
increasing as those intuitions become more widely shared. As a normative 
matter, it would deliver a heavy blow to the legal system’s legitimacy—
roughly speaking its entitlement to respect if not obedience34—if ordinary 
people could not relatively reliably determine their legal rights and 
obligations based on their untutored linguistic instincts or if judges’ 
ascription of meaning to statutes impressed ordinary people as arbitrary or 
Humpty Dumpty-like.35 But neither should judges decide hard statutory 
interpretation cases based on an opinion poll, the results of which might be 
unreliable anyway. Whenever there is no linguistic fact of the matter about 
statutes’ meanings—identifiable in the way that we identify utterances’ 
 
 34 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 23–24 (2018). 
 35 See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS 
CARROLL 214 (Modern Library ed. 1936) (“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean––neither more nor less.’”). 
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communicative content in ordinary conversation, partly in recognition of 
speakers’ communicative intentions—the grounds for determinate choice 
need to be normative. 
In maintaining that we can have linguistic intuitions about what statutes 
mean, but that we cannot reach well-grounded linguistic judgments adequate 
to resolve contestable cases in the absence of speakers with more than 
minimal communicative intentions, I propose an “error theory,” which is 
meant to challenge philosophers of language as well as judges and lawyers. 
That theory answers the question, “How should we account for widespread 
agreement that even contested statutes frequently have clear meanings—
with the debate being solely about what the clear meaning is—in the absence 
of speakers whose communicative intentions would help to ground those 
meanings?” In reading statutes, it is hard not to assume that they have 
linguistic meanings, somehow traceable to the intentions of a legislature that 
has set out to tell us what to do or what the consequences of certain conduct 
will be, even in cases outside the legislature’s minimal, collective intent to 
communicate, in English, whatever its words, in context, would necessarily 
mean. And judges, in explaining their linguistic intuitions, may have good 
reason to refer to the intentions and purposes that they—like ordinary 
people—may almost reflexively impute to the legislature. Nevertheless, 
judges and legal theorists should be aware that imputing anything beyond 
minimal intentions or purposes to the legislature typically involves a fiction 
if not an epistemological error. Legislative intent and legislative purposes, 
as invoked to ground statutory interpretations, are both constructs, devised 
more to justify intuitions or outcomes than to discover what statutes mean as 
a matter of linguistic fact.36 Part III talks at length about the complexity of 
judges’ and Justices’ necessary choices and the legal framework in which 
those choices ought to be made. 
Part III also emphasizes the implications of my error theory for what 
we can realistically expect legislatures to accomplish. If complex statutes are 
to be reasonably functional in the absence of determinate legislative 
intentions as anchors for interpretation, courts must assume the role of 
helpmates to the legislature. In order to do so, courts must ascribe sometimes 
contestable purposes to statutes—much in the way that purposivists 
advocate, but with sensitive attention to the desideratum of achieving 
consistency with widely shared linguistic intuitions. In casting themselves as 
junior partners to the legislature, courts need to understand and respect the 
limited capacity of the legislature to “speak” clearly and determinately while 
 
 36 See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 982 (describing legislative intent as a benign and valuable “fiction”). 
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seeking to realize an ideal of governmental legitimacy that has important, 
but not exclusive, democratic wellsprings. 
The Article’s final contribution is to frame new questions for lawyers, 
philosophers of language, and political theorists by showing how statutory 
interpretation in contestable cases necessarily occurs at the blurry 
intersections of their respective disciplines. At the moment of ultimate 
interpretive decision, law typically matters, as do linguistic intuitions arising 
from law’s reliance on natural language, as do normative considerations 
involving the legitimacy of judicial decisions and the legal system as a 
whole. But precisely how these various factors matter, and how they interact 
with each other to support well-justified conclusions, is a question that has 
drawn too little specific attention. 
My argument unfolds in four Parts. Part I argues that the model of 
conversational interpretation cannot ground judgments about statutes’ 
linguistic meanings in the kinds of reasonably contestable cases that perplex 
courts. Part I further traces the parallel efforts of textualists and purposivists 
to invent substitutes for legislative intent to guide judicial decision-making 
and exposes the defects in their strategies. Part II advances the thesis that the 
construction of fictitious legislative intentions or purposes both is and ought 
to be driven by normative values. Judges’ guiding aspiration should be to 
resolve cases in the most morally and politically legitimate way—which will 
ordinarily require them to follow the law when the law is determinate and to 
reach the results that will best maintain or enhance the moral legitimacy of 
the legal system in cases in which they must exercise substantive moral 
judgment. Part II maintains that debates between textualists and purposivists 
are largely normative in character, but it also argues that much of the debate 
misapprehends the most fundamental normative challenge, which is that of 
giving substantive content to the abstract fiction of “objective” legislative 
intent or legislative purposes. Part III argues that although ordinary linguistic 
intuitions about statutes’ meanings rest on ultimately untenable assumptions, 
the moral legitimacy of the legal system depends on ordinary citizens’ 
capacity to rely on their linguistic intuitions to determine their rights and 
obligations in most contexts. Having done so, it elaborates the implications 
of that recognition, including for how we should understand both the 
legislative and the judicial roles in a political democracy. Part IV concludes 
the Article with reflections on the relationship between law and language. I 
argue that lawyers, judges, and legal theorists need a better understanding of 
how language works than most have achieved so far, but that statutory 
interpretation also poses challenges that philosophers of language have not 
plumbed adequately. 
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I. THE ILL FIT BETWEEN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE MODEL 
OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Nearly all debate about statutory interpretation assumes that we do and 
should interpret statutes in roughly the same way that we discern the meaning 
of utterances in ordinary conversation.37 Typically, in conversation, a known 
speaker says something to a particular listener or listeners in a specific 
context. In ordinary conversation, moreover, nearly all agree that speakers’ 
intentions play a crucial role in determining the meaning of their utterances. 
Insofar as dispute exists, it mostly involves the precise mechanism through 
which speakers’ intentions achieve their significance. According to the 
influential theories of H.P. Grice, the meaning of an utterance simply is the 
speaker’s intended meaning.38 According to other theorists, the meaning of 
an utterance is a function of multiple factors, of which a speaker’s intentions 
are only one.39 Philosopher of language Scott Soames equates utterance 
meaning with “what a reasonable hearer or reader who knows the linguistic 
meaning of [the sentence that is uttered] S, and is aware of all relevant 
intersubjectively available features of the context of the utterance, would 
rationally take the speaker’s use of S to be intended to convey and commit 
the speaker to.”40 Either way, utterance meaning depends on the 
communicative intentions of a particular speaker addressing a particular 
audience in a particular context.41 Inferences will also reflect actual or 
 
 37 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. For discussion of works by scholars who have rejected 
the mainstream assumption on this point, see infra Section III.D. 
 38 See ANDREI MARMOR, supra note 4, at 19 (“According to a Gricean view, . . . [w]hatever the 
speaker actually intended to say is the content asserted.”); Solum, supra note 8, at 491 (“The speaker’s 
meaning (or utterer’s meaning) of an utterance is the illocutionary uptake that the speaker intended to 
produce in the audience on the basis of the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention.”). See 
generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 117 (1989) (characterizing utterer’s meaning as 
“basic” and other notions of meaning as “(I hope) derivative”). 
 39 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 8 (asserting that the communicative content of utterances “is 
determined by a variety of factors, including the semantic content of the sentence uttered, the 
communicative intentions of the speaker, the shared presuppositions of the speaker-hearers, and obvious 
features of the context of utterance”). 
 40 Soames, A Post-Originalist Theory, supra note 9, at 598. The reference to what a listener would 
“rationally take” a speaker to commit to is potentially ambiguous: it might refer either to what rationality 
would dictate (and only to what rationality would dictate) or to what one person might rationally (or not 
irrationally) take to be the case even if another did not. If used in the former sense, Soames’s formulation 
would result in a limited conception of utterance meaning, restricted to what a speaker’s use of an 
utterance would commit him or her to as a matter of rational necessity. The restricted conception of 
utterance meaning would closely approximate that which would emerge as an inference from what I 
referred to above as the “minimal intent” that must be imputed to a speaker in order to make a sentence 
intelligible in the context of its utterance. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 41 Accordingly, Soames acknowledges contexts in which the appropriate specification of the content 
of an utterance would depend on “what the rule-makers understand themselves to be prohibiting.” 
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presupposed common knowledge—what the listener takes the speaker to 
know about her and about the context and imagines that the speaker will take 
for granted that she, the listener, knows.42 
This Part begins by arguing that the analogy of statutory interpretation 
to conversational interpretation fails, at least as extended to cases in which 
linguistic intuitions can reasonably diverge. It then traces efforts by both 
textualists and purposivists to salvage the model of conversational 
interpretation as applicable to statutory interpretation by devising substitutes 
for the psychological intentions of an actual legislative speaker—“objective 
intentions” in the case of textualists, legislative “purposes” for purposivists. 
Finally, this Part documents the fallacy of this strategy: insofar as statutes’ 
purported linguistic meanings depend on invented substitutes for the 
psychological assumptions and intentions of an actual speaker, then the 
meanings of disputed statutes will themselves be inventions, too. The result 
is a muddle: textualists and purposivists purport to disagree about statutes’ 
linguistic meanings, but their real dispute is about what intentions or 
purposes to impute to legislatures in cases involving disputed statutes. 
A. The Nonexistence of Collective Legislative Intentions 
Although debates about statutory interpretation abound with talk about 
legislative intent,43 the idea that the legislature has or could have a single 
communicative intention in the same rich, psychological sense as an 
individual speaker is a fiction in all disputable cases. In claiming that 
legislatures lack discernible communicative intentions in the psychological 
sense, I break no new ground.44 Arguments to this effect are well-known and 
widely accepted. 
 
SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts, supra note 3, at 417 n.7; see also Soames, Toward a Theory, supra 
note 5, at 241 (“Since what language users intend to say, assert, or stipulate is a crucial factor, along with 
the linguistic meanings of the words they use, in constituting what they do say, assert, or stipulate, the 
intentions of lawmakers are directly relevant to the contents of the laws they enact.”). 
 42 See Robert Stalnaker, Common Ground, 25 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 701, 701 (2002). Philosophers of 
language emphasize the importance of “presuppositions” to successful communication. See, e.g., SCOTT 
SOAMES, Presupposition, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT MEANS 
AND HOW WE USE IT, supra note 3, at 75–76 (distinguishing among logical, expressive, and pragmatic 
presuppositions); Robyn Carston, Legal Texts and Canons of Construction: A View from Current 
Pragmatic Theory, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2011, at 8, 9 (Michael 
Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013) (distinguishing pragmatic presupposition from semantic 
presupposition). 
 43 For a catalogue of examples, some recent and some stretching into the early nineteenth century, 
see Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19. 
 44 See, e.g., id. 
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1. The Shared View of Textualists and Purposivists 
In the case of a speaker in ordinary conversation, communicative 
intentions exist as a matter of psychological fact. In the case of a large, 
multimember legislature, by contrast, there is no analogous psychological 
entity. Legal texts do not have unitary authors.45 Sometimes, no member of 
the legislature that enacts a statute may actually have read every word of it.46 
For these reasons among others, textualists—who have been the main 
drivers of modern debates about statutory interpretation—expressly 
emphasize that the legislature could not have a collective communicative 
intent. As they like to put it, the legislature is a “they,” not an “it.”47 
Against this textualist commonplace, Professor Andrei Marmor 
maintains that shared intentions of a majority of the legislature should suffice 
to establish an intention that could be attributed to the legislature as a 
whole.48 It is improbable, however, that a majority of the legislature would 
share overlapping communicative intentions that bear usefully on the kinds 
of questions that divide judges in interpreting complex statutes—which can 
include hundreds of pages, written by multiple drafters, and which most 
members are unlikely even to have read.49 
Moreover, even if individual legislators’ communicative intentions did 
overlap to a greater or lesser extent, there would be a conceptual problem, 
highlighted by Professor Ryan Doerfler. Even though legislatures comprise 
 
 45 For pathbreaking empirical work on how statutes are actually drafted, see Lisa Schultz Bressman 
& Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane 
S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 
(2002). Among their central findings are that a variety of congressional staff—including committee staff 
with policy-based goals and expertise, nonpartisan drafting experts in the Office of Legislative Counsel, 
and personal staff—often have a role in the drafting of legislation, see Bressman & Gluck, supra, at 783–
84; Nourse & Schacter, supra, at 583–90; that inconsistencies of purpose and usage frequently emerge as 
a result, see Bressman & Gluck, supra, at 783–84; and that members of Congress rarely draft legislative 
language themselves, see Nourse & Schacter, supra, at 585–86. 
 46 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 45, at 608. 
 47 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992). Echoing this formulation, textualists emphasize that legislatures are 
multimember bodies lacking shared psychological intentions. See, e.g., Manning, Textualism and 
Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 430–31; see also Scott Soames, Justice Scalia’s Philosophy of 
Interpretation: From Textualism to Deferentialism, in JUSTICE SCALIA: RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 21, 26 (Brian G. Slocum & Francis J. Mootz III eds., 2019) (“In an age in which major pieces of 
legislation routinely contain thousands of pages of text written by small armies of staffers, . . . [t]o 
imagine that one could ask each member what he or she intended in adopting the text, and, by aggregating, 
converge on a meaningful result is, as Scalia rightly suggests, absurd.”). 
 48 MARMOR, supra note 4, at 162–65. 
 49 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Comment, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 69–70, 83 (2015);  
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 45, at 585–86. 
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multiple members, there is an important sense in which Congress, in its 
constitutional capacity as a collective lawmaking institution, is “an ‘it,’ not 
a ‘they.’”50 As Doerfler puts it, “If the legislative power belongs to Congress 
as a single body, . . . either Congress forms intentions qua ‘it’ or there is no 
legislative intent.”51 In other words, if we want to know the intent of the 
lawmaker in order to interpret a statute, we seem to need an institutional 
intent, not an aggregation of the communicative intentions of individual 
members. 
Purposivists also recognize that the legislature is not capable of having 
a shared or unitary psychological intent that is sufficiently rich or 
determinate to resolve disputed cases. Purposivists thus talk not about 
legislative intent, but about legislative purposes. Moreover, they 
conceptualize legislative purpose as something that needs to be imagined or 
constructed and then imputed. As a perceptive commentator once 
summarized, the paradigmatically purposivist Legal Process theory of Henry 
Hart and Albert Sacks calls for judges to “conjure up plausible organizing 
purposes for” statutes, rather than discover them, and then to interpret 
statutes in light of the ascribed purposes.52 
2. The Insights and Limitations of Modern Intentionalist Theories 
In agreeing with textualists and purposivists that legislatures do not 
have shared or collective psychological intentions of the kind that would be 
necessary to resolve most disputed cases, or those in which linguistic 
intuitions diverge, I have endeavored to maintain the highlighted 
qualification. That qualification is important in light of the insight—first 
developed in philosophical work on group agency—that people often intend 
to do things together.53 For example, two or more people can intend to take 
a walk together or to cook dinner together. In these cases, the relevant 
intentions are “we-intentions,” not “I-intentions.” If two people intend to 
take a walk or cook dinner together, their intentions are joint or interlocked, 
not just the psychologically separate intentions of two people each of whom 
independently intends to take a walk or to cook dinner. 
 
 50 See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 999–1000. 
 51 Id. at 1000; see also id. at 1002–03. 
 52 Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249 (1992); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The 
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 600–01 (1995) 
(similarly characterizing the Hart & Sacks approach). 
 53 Leading works in developing accounts of group agency and group intention include MICHAEL E. 
BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY (1999), and 
CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF 
CORPORATE AGENTS (2011). 
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Extending this insight about the possibility of group agency to the 
legislature, we might say—as I acknowledged in the Introduction—that 
legislators intend to legislate together by participating in a process that will 
yield a group-endorsed result. We might further say, as Professor Richard 
Ekins has maintained, that the members of a legislature have a joint or 
interlocking intent to legislate pursuant to the standing rules of legislative 
procedure.54 It may be equally accurate to say that they intend to legislate in 
English55 and to compel, forbid, or stipulate whatever the words of a statute 
would necessarily commit an author of the words of a statute, as read in 
context, to compelling, forbidding, or stipulating. 
If so, Ekins has explained how the model of conversational 
interpretation could apply, or could easily be adapted to apply, to cases that 
can be decided in reliance on what I have called “minimal” communicative 
intentions.56 But minimal intentions that are necessarily inferable from a 
speaker’s use of particular words in a particular linguistic context typically 
will not resolve disputable cases. Tellingly, at a key juncture in his argument, 
Ekins appears to acknowledge that he has failed to bridge this gap. After 
explaining that legislators can have interlocking intentions to legislate 
together, Ekins’s argument takes a teleological and normative turn, relying 
on the premise that legislation must be viewed as a “reasoned scheme” for 
the common good.57 Consistent with this premise, Ekins then asserts that the 
intentions that most specifically matter to the interpretation of legislation are 
those of what he calls “well-formed” legislatures, posited to satisfy the 
demands of legitimacy in the exercise of political power, not actual ones.58 
Other theorists have emphasized that collectives other than legislatures 
can sometimes be said to have more than minimal communicative 
intentions.59 But their characteristic examples differ materially from the case 
of legislatures. The attribution of communicative intentions to corporations, 
for example, typically involves an actual or imagined delegation of authority 
to an identified person. For instance, a corporation might empower its chief 
executive officer or a spokesperson to speak on behalf of the corporation. In 
seeking to determine the meaning of a corporate statement, we then might 
 
 54 RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 219–22 (2012). 
 55 See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention 
Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004). 
 56 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 57 EKINS, supra note 54, at 247–49. 
 58 Id. at 143, 178–79. 
 59 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99 (2010); 
RAZ, supra note 23, at 280. 
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look to the communicative intent of the authorized spokesperson or decision-
maker. 
No similar delegation occurs in the case of legislatures. Professor 
Lawrence Solan has argued that members of Congress share a “general 
recognition that those who ushered [a] bill through the process did so with 
particular [intentions] that deserve to be honored.”60 Although Solan does not 
specify whom exactly he has in mind, he offers the committees that draft 
legislation and issue accompanying reports as central examples. But 
Congress has never adopted an interpretive norm assigning authoritative 
status to committee reports, much less to the individual intentions of 
members of drafting committees, even though it imaginably could. 
We could also imagine a similar argument that Congress should be 
viewed as adopting the communicative intentions of whoever drafted a 
statute or any of its relevant, disputed parts, even if language was pasted in 
without committee deliberation. But it strikes me as implausible that most 
members of Congress actually share any such we-intention, and I know of 
no empirical studies that would support the suggestion that they do. Absent 
such evidence, it would take a normative argument, not a linguistic one, to 
establish that an enacting legislature should be viewed as having a “we-
intention” to adopt the communicative intentions of whoever happened to 
write a disputed provision. If we look at who actually drafts legislation, the 
drafters are frequently a diverse variety of committee and personal staffers61 
and, in some cases, may include lobbyists.62 From a normative perspective, 
it would be bizarre to think that the meaning of legislation should depend on 
the communicative intentions of a lobbyist. 
B. Invention 
With legislatures lacking shared or collective communicative intent of 
a kind to which readers or listeners could appeal in seeking to resolve 
uncertainties about statutes’ meanings, one might expect participants in and 
theorists of statutory interpretation to abandon the model of conversational 
interpretation as a framework for their efforts. Instead, most try to adjust or 
patch up that model by inventing an analogue to actual speakers’ 
communicative intentions. But their strategies of invention fail—for reasons 
 
 60 Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in 
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 447 (2005). 
 61 See supra note 45. 
 62 See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 106 (2015) 
(“Legislative drafts can also emerge from private authors—interest groups, industry, academics, 
individual policy experts, or bodies of experts like the Administrative Conference or the American Law 
Institute.”). 
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that vary slightly depending on the particular invention that a theorist 
advances. 
1. Textualism and Objective Intent 
For textualists, the invented substitute for legislative intent in the 
psychological sense is “objective” or “objectified” intent,63 which Justice 
Scalia defined as “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the 
text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”64 The 
textualists’ terminology in effecting this substitution reveals both the 
considerable ingenuity and the large ambition of their strategy: to devise a 
conception of legislative intent that is admittedly invented or fictional65 but 
that can nevertheless make claims to “objective” status. In implementing this 
strategy, textualists proceed in two steps. First, they shift the focus in their 
search for the communicative content of legislation from the speaker, and 
what the speaker intended, to the listener, and to what a reasonable listener 
would take statutory language to mean, in context.66 By itself, this step does 
not take textualists all the way to where they want to go. Because reasonable 
listeners figure out what utterances mean partly by reference to what they 
take the speaker’s communicative intentions to be, a gap remains to be filled. 
The second textualist step, involving the positing of an objective intent, aims 
not only to fill this gap, but to do so in a way that restricts judges to reliance 
on known, publicly accessible facts. 
On the surface, the claim that legislative intentions could be 
simultaneously invented or fictional67 and also “objective” risks self-
contradiction. If I understand correctly, textualists believe that the intentions 
they posit can be aptly characterized as objective because of the way in which 
they are identified. According to leading textualists, reasonable readers or 
listeners ascertain the meaning of statutory provisions, like other utterances, 
by relying on “conventions” of language use that exist as a matter of 
 
 63 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 64 Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 
 65 See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 982–83 (characterizing legislative intent as fictional). 
 66 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 16 (“In their full context, words mean what they conveyed 
to reasonable people at the time they were written . . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original 
Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“The meaning of statutes is 
to be found not in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively 
reasonable person.”); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 14, at 2392–93 (“[Textualists] ask how a reasonable 
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 423–24; Manning, Without 
the Pretense, supra note 19, 2400–01; id. at 2421–22 & n.151 (attributing a fictionalist view to Justice 
Scalia). 
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objective, social fact.68 With conventions of language use grounding claims 
of objectivity, textualists purport to work backward from the interpretive 
conclusions that conventions dictate to a conception of the speakers’ intent 
that applicable conventions presuppose. Dean John Manning—the textualist 
who has written most prolifically on the topic of reasonable listeners and 
objective legislative intentions—thus asserts repeatedly that objective intent 
is the “minimal” communicative intent that must be postulated in order to 
trigger the “shared conventions [of a community] for decoding language in 
context.”69 
If Manning were right that we have “shared conventions for decoding 
language in context” that can operate without reliance on speakers’ 
subjective communicative intentions or suppositions about interpretive 
common ground, then textualists could claim that the “objective” intentions 
of the legislature are whatever communicative intentions a reasonable 
listener or reader needs to impute to the legislature in order for its utterances 
to mean what linguistic conventions establish that they mean.70 But the 
premise—that we have conventions for “decoding” language without 
reference to speakers’ subjective communicative intentions or to what 
speakers subjectively know or assume—is false in most, if not all, disputable 
cases. A reasonable listener, in context, would seek to ascertain an 
utterance’s meaning by reference to a speaker’s likely communicative 
intentions, among other considerations.71 And if meaning in context depends 
on speakers’ communicative intentions, there is an obvious, fallacious 
circularity in beginning with what a reasonable listener would take a statute 
 
 68 See Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 25, at 16 (describing textualists’ premise “that a 
faithful agent’s job is to decode legislative instructions according to the common social and linguistic 
conventions shared by the relevant community”); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. 
REV. 113, 176 [hereinafter Manning, New Purposivism] (maintaining that “unless interpreters give 
priority to the shared semantic conventions that make it possible for legislators to communicate their 
policies to the law’s implementers, a legislature cannot predictably use language as a tool to define the 
scope and limits of the background legislative policies that the statutory text carries into effect”); 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 434 (explaining textualism’s reliance on 
“conventions” as a source of meaning in the absence of subjective legislative intent). 
 69 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 434; see also Manning, Equity of the 
Statute, supra note 25, at 16. 
 70 Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 434. 
 71 In rejecting a “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation, Dean Manning thus writes—
quoting another prominent textualist, Judge Easterbrook—that “[b]ecause textualists want to know the 
way a reasonable user of language would understand a statutory phrase in the circumstances in which it 
is used, they must always ascertain the unstated ‘assumptions shared by the speakers and the intended 
audience.’” Manning, What Divides, supra note 14, at 81 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does 
Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990)). I do not fully know what Manning 
means by this sentence in light of his more characteristic insistence that legislatures are not the kind of 
entity capable of holding assumptions. 
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to mean, in context, and using that meaning as a basis for imputing an 
“objective” legislative intent. Until content is given to speakers’ intentions, 
the textualist project spins in a vacuous circle. 
Professor Doerfler has suggested that textualists might surmount this 
difficulty by relying on the “fiction” of a “generic” speaker with the similarly 
generic assumptions and communicative intentions that the utterer of a 
statutory directive should be assumed to have “just on the basis of her having 
written the statute as enacted.”72 This idea of a fictional, generic speaker 
promises to solve the circularity problem: we now start with a speaker as 
well as a listener. 
The remaining problem is that the idea of a generic speaker will almost 
inevitably prove either too thin or too thick to solve the problems that lead 
textualists to conjure the idea of an objective legislative intent in the first 
place. For reasons that I have emphasized, if the only imputed 
communicative intentions are the “minimal intentions” necessary to render 
a statutory provision intelligible in its linguistic and historical context, then 
the idea of a generic speaker will not resolve any reasonably disputable 
question of statutory interpretation. Consider the following examples, drawn 
almost randomly from fields in which I teach. When legislators confer rights 
or obligations on “any person” or use such generic terms as “employer,” do 
they intend to treat state and local governments as persons or employers?73 
When federal statutes confer jurisdiction on federal or state courts, do they 
mandate its exercise in absolutely all cases?74 When Congress enacts a 
federal regulatory statute, does it intend to impliedly repeal or displace prior 
federal legislation dealing with the same or similar issues75 or preempt state 
legislation regulating the same or similar activities?76 In all of these cases, it 
seems nearly self-evident that different speakers uttering the words of the 
 
 72 See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 1043. 
 73 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (ruling that judges are not covered “employees” 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
(reversing an earlier decision and holding that local governments are among the “persons” to which a 
statute authorizing suits to redress constitutional violations applies). 
 74 Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74–75 (1984) (answering in the affirmative), with David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) (answering in the negative). 
 75 See, e.g., Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (concluding that a provision of .the 
National Labor Relations Act that authorizes workers to litigate collectively did not displace a provision 
of the Federal Arbitration Act that makes arbitration agreements that waive litigation rights judicially 
enforceable); City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (holding that Congress’s 
provision of express remedies for violation of a federal statute impliedly withdrew remedies that 
otherwise would have existed under an earlier, more general statute).  
 76 See generally Meltzer, supra note 31, at 7 (criticizing textualist theories that would preclude courts 
from finding implied preemption and defending purposivism as necessary to “the task of fashioning a 
workable legal system”). 
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relevant statutes might have had different communicative intentions that 
might have helped to clarify the meaning of their utterances, in context. The 
minimal intentions that all legislators necessarily would have shared—such 
as intentions to legislate intelligibly, in English, and to stipulate or prescribe 
convey what any non-ironic utterer would inescapably commit herself to 
stipulating or prescribing—resolve nothing. 
Nor does it help to equate generic or minimal intent with an intent to 
rely exclusively on settled linguistic “conventions.” If we wanted generic 
linguistic conventions for determining the meaning of utterances in context, 
there might seem to be no better candidates than Grice’s well-known maxims 
for successful communication through natural language—including 
injunctions to “[m]ake your contribution as informative as is required,” “[t]ry 
to make your contribution one that is true,” “[b]e relevant,” and “[a]void 
obscurity of expression.”77 For textualists, however, reliance on Gricean 
assumptions as sources of interpretive common ground for legislatures and 
the audiences of legislation would pose at least three problems. First, as 
Grice made explicit, his maxims reflect a pervasive assumption that the 
speaker and the listener are engaged in a cooperative activity.78 Yet many, if 
not most, textualists reject this assumption in the legislative context,79 where 
legislative compromises may seek to obfuscate differences, not cooperate 
with imagined listeners or readers in achieving clarity of understanding.80 
Second, Grice’s maxims are both defeasible and underdeterminate in many 
cases.81 Third, the Gricean maxims assume the existence of intersubjective 
common ground between speaker and audience—which is missing in the 
absence of a speaker with actual knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs—in 
light of which it can be gauged how a particular utterance might be 
“relevant,” “informative,” or “obscur[e].”82 
 
 77 GRICE, supra note 38, at 26–28. According to Grice, we normally trust others to observe these 
maxims and feel entitled to draw inferences about the meaning of their utterances in reliance on them. 
See id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See, e.g., Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19, at 2422–23. 
 80 See Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of 
Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 83. 
 81 See Carston, Legal Texts and Canons of Construction, in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 2011, supra note 42, at 13–15 (describing the use of Grice’s maxims as “highly context-
sensitive” and noting that there must be some “constraints[,] conditions . . . and/or ordering in their 
application” to avoid ambiguous or contradictory results); Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal 
Language, 21 RATIO JURIS. 423, 430–38 (2008) (identifying problems with the application of Gricean 
maxims to a legislative context, which in some ways “does not abide by the Gricean maxims of 
cooperative interaction”). 
 82 See Marmor, supra note 81, at 431, 434–38. 
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Textualists’ claims that other, less fundamental, conventions will 
decisively resolve hard cases are correspondingly unpersuasive. Bluff 
protestations of confidence notwithstanding,83 we have no linguistic 
conventions to take us beyond what speakers with otherwise unknown 
communicative intentions would necessarily commit themselves to. Beyond 
the literal meaning of sentences, we enter the domain of pragmatics, where 
textualists can identify no purely linguistic conventions for determining 
which elements of context matter to statutory interpretation. And insofar as 
the relevant, purported conventions are legal, the canons of statutory 
construction are contested and frequently underdeterminate, as past and 
continuing debates about statutory interpretation notoriously attest.84 
It would, of course, be possible for textualists to respond to the problem 
of semantic underdeterminacy by furnishing a thicker conception of generic 
legislative intent. If the idea of a “generic” intent is a fiction, then one can 
write fictions as one will. But, because there are innumerable ways in which 
 
 83 In suggesting that linguistic conventions, and objective intentions derived from them, could resolve 
disputed questions, Dean Manning—often purporting to characterize the position of Justice Scalia and 
other textualists—relies recurrently on selected passages by legal and political philosophers who have 
emphasized legislatures’ justified reliance on conventions of interpretation and, more generally, on the 
conventional nature of language. One is Professor Joseph Raz, who asserts that legislators should be 
assumed to vote for legislation with the “minimal intention” to make law that will be “understood” in 
accordance with the norms of “their legal culture.” RAZ, supra note 23, at 284. As the surrounding 
passage makes plain, however, Raz advances no substantive claims about how any provision will or 
should be interpreted within a particular legal culture. His immediate concern is not with interpretation, 
but with the “minimal intention” necessary for legislative action “to count as a lawmaking act” by a 
legitimate lawmaking authority. Id. at 285. Manning has also quoted on multiple occasions from a cryptic 
passage by the political theorist Jeremy Waldron: 
A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision . . . does so on the assumption that—to put it 
crudely—what the words mean to him is identical to what they will mean to those to whom they 
are addressed (in the event that the provision is passed). . . . That such assumptions pervade the 
legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the shared conventions that 
constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that conventions comprise. 
Jeremy Waldron, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: 
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); see Manning, Equity of the 
Statute, supra note 25, at 16 nn.64–65; Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 
433; Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19, at 2427 n.179. But that just-quoted passage, though 
it undoubtedly insists that conventions of language use exist, says nothing about what the relevant 
conventions are, nor about whether they speak to the kinds of questions that textualists invoke them to 
resolve, nor about their relative determinacy or underdeterminacy. 
 84 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 545, 561 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15) (observing that 
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995)—in 
which the Supreme Court divided 6-3 over the application of a provision that made it an offense to “take” 
an endangered species to actions by private landowners that destroy endangered species’ habitats—
“[t]here were more than a dozen [applicable] canons [of interpretation] available for the Justices, and they 
deployed them like battlefield weapons”). 
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a fiction could be filled out, any substantive elaboration would put claims to 
identify an “objective” intent deeply at risk. 
To meet this difficulty, a defender of the view that linguistic 
conventions generate determinate and objective conclusions in disputed 
cases might imaginably adopt a functionalist approach to the identification 
of relevant conventions. On this view, we infer the existence of conventions 
from their efficacy in producing agreed “conventional meanings” in many if 
not most cases. And if agreement is the measure of what conventions dictate, 
then textualists might insist that even disputed statutes have “conventional 
meanings,” as determined by the outcome of opinion polls, even if the results 
are not anchored in any account of what makes a judgment by any of the 
respondents correct. But the law has always treated the idea that statutory 
language bears its ordinary or conventional meaning as defeasible, based on 
relevant features of context.85 If this premise is correct, there would be 
endless disputes about which purported features of “context” the subjects of 
a poll should be exposed to. Indeed, Dean Manning has described disputes 
about which features of context should be treated as relevant as the central 
bone of contention between textualists and purposivists: textualists 
emphasize semantic context, while purposivists emphasize policy context.86 
Abandoning pretensions that linguistic conventions can alone produce 
determinate outcomes in disputed cases, a textualist might maintain that law, 
in the form of legal conventions, renders determinate what a statute’s 
linguistic meaning might otherwise have left unsettled. I shall discuss that 
possibility in Part II. In this Section, I have focused wholly on textualists’ 
suggestion that conventions of language use frequently reveal an objective 
intent that is capable of yielding correct answers to disputed questions that 
any ordinary, reasonable language user ought to be able to discern in 
contested cases.87 As we have seen, that suggestion collapses upon close 
examination. 
 
 85 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (recognizing that “the ‘meaning—or 
ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”); Brown v. 
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of 
statutory context . . . .” (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, (2000))). 
 86 See Manning, What Divides, supra note 14, at 91. 
 87 Manning often takes this view, perhaps most typically in defense of Justice Scalia’s claims to have 
identified what ordinary or conventional usage indicates about how controverted language must be 
interpreted or “decoded” in context. See, e.g., Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 25, at 111 
(endorsing Justice Scalia’s conclusion that a provision enhancing penalties for “using a firearm” in the 
context of committing a crime did not include bartering the gun); Manning, Textualism and Legislative 
Intent, supra note 21, at 441–42 (explicating and defending Justice Scalia’s reliance on “semantic 
context” to find a clear result in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–92 (1991) 
(holding that a statutory reference to “a reasonable attorney’s fee” does not include fees paid to experts 
assisting attorneys)); Manning, What Divides, supra note 14, at 93–94 (same). 
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2. Purposivism and Legislative Purposes 
Like textualists, purposivists seek a substitute for the communicative 
intent of the legislature as a whole, which, for them, is legislative purpose. 
In relying on purpose, not intent, purposivists’ stance toward the model of 
conversational interpretation may be more equivocal than that of textualists. 
Purposivists acknowledge the need for judges to ascribe normative values to 
the legislature in order to give content to the idea of legislative purposes. In 
the famous phrase of Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, purposivists 
postulate that the legislature consists of reasonable people seeking to 
promote reasonable goals in reasonable ways.88 In this formulation, the 
notion of reasonableness has a substantial normative component: it is not 
mere means-ends rationality. A reasonable legislator is a legislator with 
values that must first be identified and then adjudged as reasonable.89 This, 
we should recall, is textualists’ leading objection to purposivism.90 
At the same time, purposivists—or at least a growing cadre of “new 
purposivists”91—hew as closely as they can to the model of conversational 
interpretation and can be viewed as proposing its adaptation, not 
displacement. As explicated by Dean Manning, new purposivism 
acknowledges, and indeed emphasizes, that “the law’s ‘purpose,’ properly 
understood, embodies not merely a statute’s substantive ends . . . , but also 
Congress’s specific choices about the means to carry those ends into effect,” 
as reflected in statutory language.92 The aim of purposivists who embrace 
this constraint on judicial imputation of explanatory purposes seems to be to 
provide enough information about an imagined legislative speaker to license 
claims about what statutes determinately mean—if not strictly based on 
 
 88 See HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1374, 1378. 
 89 The distinction that moral philosophers frequently draw between the “rational,” which can be 
understood in purely instrumental, self-interested terms, and the “reasonable,” which imports a 
disposition to behave in ways that give due consideration to the interests of others, highlights the 
normative element. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 49 n.1 (1993) (“[K]nowing that 
people are rational we do not know the ends they will pursue, only that they will pursue them intelligently. 
Knowing that people are reasonable where others are concerned, we know that they are willing to govern 
their conduct by a principle from which they and others can reason in common; and reasonable people 
take into account the consequences of their actions on others’ well-being.” (citing W.M. Sibley, The 
Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62 PHIL. REV. 554–60 (1953))); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO 
EACH OTHER 191–92 (1998). 
 90 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 68. Dean Manning’s leading exemplar of a “new” 
purposivism is Justice Elena Kagan, see id. at 116, 133-41, but he also cites opinions by Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor, see id. at 129, as embodying a more textually focused and constrained form of 
purposivism than that exhibited, for example, in the traditional purposivist chestnut of Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
 92 Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 68, at 115. 
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Congress’s communicative intent, then tied similarly closely to the 
legislature’s choice of specific language. 
As this focus indicates, purposivists, no less than textualists, seek to 
cast courts as the faithful agents of the legislature.93 Agents of course require 
direction from principals. And the model of conversational interpretation 
provides the most familiar paradigm of language-based direction. Going 
forward, I shall emphasize the strand of purposivist thought that seeks to 
approximate the model of conversational interpretation by viewing purposes 
as closely analogous substitutes for, rather than a sharp alternative to, 
legislative intent as a basis for statutory interpretation.94 
C. The Statutory Interpretation Muddle 
The strategies of textualism and purposivism, or at least the dominant 
strand of modern purposivism, lead to similar if not identical muddles. 
Nearly all textualists and nearly all purposivists begin by acknowledging that 
“legislative intent” and “legislative purpose” are fictions or inventions. Yet, 
as if oblivious to the implications of their own insight, textualists and many 
purposivists then rely on these inventions to identify statutory meanings for 
which they claim a more-than-fictional existence. 
If presented as methodologies for identifying linguistic meanings that 
depend on legislatures’ psychological states, the approaches of inventing 
objective intentions and constructing legislative purposes both look absurd. 
If the strategy of basing statutory interpretation on invented objective 
intentions or judicially constructed purposes is not absurd, the reasons would 
have to lie in normative, not linguistic, theory. The justification would need 
to be that it is necessary or appropriate to rely on an invention and that it 
would be legally or morally preferable to interpret statutes on the basis of 
one invention rather than the other.95 There would also need to be an 
accompanying confession or acknowledgment: debates about statutory 
meaning in reasonably disputed cases are not about linguistic meaning after 
all. They are debates about how judges should decide cases when a statute’s 
linguistic meaning is underdeterminate. 
 
 93 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 
266 (2002) (arguing that “purposive” interpretation “reminds the judge . . . that it is in Congress, not the 
courts, where the Constitution places the authority to enact a statute”); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and 
the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 252–53 (1998) 
(arguing that purposivism makes courts the most effective agents of the legislature). 
 94 According to Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 68, at 156, “both the traditional and new 
versions of purposivism find some support in the great book’” of the purposivist canon, HART & SACKS, 
supra note 1. 
 95 See Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19, 2425–28. 
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It is not difficult to reconceptualize the debate between textualists and 
purposivists in these terms—as about appropriately ascribed legal meanings 
in linguistically disputable cases, rather than about linguistic meanings. But 
for an explicitly normative argument for one or the other approach to 
succeed, the proponents could not stop with an abstract choice between 
textualism and purposivism. To evaluate an argument that proceeded on 
these grounds, we would need to know more about the specific “objective” 
intentions or reasonable purposes that textualist or purposivist judges would 
ascribe to a legislature, or at least about the criteria to be used in imputing 
fictional intentions or motivating purposes. 
Despite the arguments that I have offered in this Part, my claim about 
the necessity of normative judgment—extending to specific determinations 
about which intentions or purposes to ascribe to the legislature—might 
appear too strong. We can and frequently do ascribe normative values to 
speakers without endorsing those values. And even if the legislature is not 
exactly like ordinary human speakers, with communicative intentions or 
purposes in the psychological sense, there might be ways in which a 
reasonable listener could ascribe intentions or moral values to a legislature 
or an invented hypothetical legislator without endorsing them.96 For 
example, if judges thought legislation bigoted or mean-spirited, they might 
ascribe bigoted or mean-spirited intentions as a way of resolving otherwise 
doubtful cases. But insofar as judges must impute either “objective” 
intentions or “reasonable” purposes to a legislature in order to interpret a 
statute in a case in which legal norms do not determine their judgment, then 
judges, as agents of the legal system, cannot escape normative responsibility 
for the decisions that they render—as the next Part will seek to establish. 
II. LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN  
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
In debating about statutory interpretation, we debate, among other 
things, what judges ought to do. But “ought” in what sense? Judges’ 
interpretive decisions can send people to jail, impose huge financial 
penalties, upset settled expectations, or leave the poor without remedies for 
harms that they have suffered. Judges—and those of us who offer theories of 
interpretation that purport to tell judges how to interpret statutes—should 
therefore pause to ask how their acting as coercive instruments of the state 
could be justified morally. 
 
 96 See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1155 
(2003) (employing an “objective notion of intention as it is made manifest through the performance of 
actions of a certain type, actions that, because of what they involve, are typically motivated by a certain 
rationale and are reasonably interpreted as being so motivated”). 
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This Part confronts that question in several steps. I first consider—and 
reject—the possibility that American judges can rely on autonomous legal 
norms to provide determinate resolutions to reasonably disputable questions 
about statutes’ meanings or applications.97 With moral questions thus being 
unavoidable, I argue that the concept of moral or political legitimacy 
provides the best framework for thinking about how judges should resolve 
statutory disputes. Within minimally legitimate legal regimes—a term I shall 
explain shortly—judges should strongly presumptively apply the law. But 
where the law either requires judges to exercise normative judgment or 
leaves them no choice but to do so, judges should adopt the conclusion that 
is most morally legitimate under the circumstance. 
In the argument’s next step, I show that debates between textualists and 
purposivists are, in an important sense, debates about the most important 
sources of moral and political legitimacy. Textualists appeal to ideals of 
democracy. By contrast, purposivists rely on good government as a source 
of moral legitimacy: they seek to enlist the courts as “junior partners”98 of 
the legislature in interpreting statutes as pursuing reasonable goals by 
reasonable means. 
In a final step, my argument then shows that debates between textualists 
and purposivists, even as thus recast, still fail to come to grips with ultimately 
crucial issues. Abstract appeals to democratic accountability and 
substantively just outcomes as sources of judicial legitimacy leave too many 
questions unresolved. It is impossible to determine whether a textualist or a 
purposivist approach would produce more legitimate outcomes without 
considering how judges should give substantive content to the otherwise 
underdetermined notions of “objective” legislative intent and reasonable 
legislative purpose. 
A. Law? 
If judges require moral justifications for their decisions to deploy the 
coercive apparatus of the state in favor of one party to a dispute, the resulting 
challenge is a daunting one, which I may seem to have framed too bluntly or 
to have arrived at too quickly. Judges operate within legal systems. And it is 
possible, I shall assume, that legal norms can direct the process of statutory 
 
 97 I continue to assume that statutes’ linguistic meanings are reasonably disputable insofar as minimal, 
necessarily inferable communicative intentions and their contributions to listeners’ understandings fail to 
resolve questions arising under them. 
 98 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners of Congress in Statutory 
Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating the Scholarship of Daniel J. Meltzer, 91 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1743 (2016); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (2007). 
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interpretation with considerable determinacy. If so, and if the legal system is 
a morally decent or legitimate one, then judges who have promised to obey 
the law presumptively ought to do so.99 In a recent article, Professors William 
Baude and Stephen Sachs assert that our legal system reasonably 
approximates the state of affairs that I have just described: the law of 
interpretation almost invariably either renders determinate what language 
otherwise would have left underdeterminate or supplants linguistic meaning 
with a more specific legal meaning.100 
There should be no doubt that law contributes importantly to the 
interpretive context in which judges must ascribe meaning to statutes—by 
which, on this occasion, I mean to refer legal meaning. And we might say 
that a statute’s legal meaning differs from its linguistic meaning, with which 
Part I was concerned, if legal norms either clarify or alter linguistic meaning. 
I put this point equivocally, in terms of what we might say, because the 
relationship between linguistic meaning and legal meaning is deeply 
complex—a matter to which I shall return in Part IV. If an utterance’s 
linguistic meaning is its meaning in context, and if an utterance occurs in a 
legal context, then perhaps any relevant legal norms are elements of the 
context that generate linguistic meaning.101 
Although I am unsure how leading textualists such as Dean Manning 
and Justice Scalia conceptualize the relationship between linguistic and legal 
meaning, they unquestionably assume that legal norms interact with ordinary 
conventions of language use in determining how courts should interpret 
statutes. Manning thus writes: 
Because textualists want to know the way a reasonable user of language would 
understand a statutory phrase in the circumstances in which it is used, they must 
always ascertain the unstated “assumptions shared by the speakers and the 
intended audience.” In particular, when operating within the realm of legal 
parlance (a relevant linguistic subcommunity), textualism’s premise requires 
that interpreters consider specialized conventions and linguistic practices 
peculiar to the law.102 
Other textualists adopt similar stances. Judge Easterbrook maintains 
that statutes defining criminal offenses and prescribing penalties 
 
 99 See DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 202 (1984); Richard M. Re, Promising the 
Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 302–03 (2016). 
 100 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017). 
 101 Cf. P.F. Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 PHIL. REV. 439, 456–57 (1964) 
(distinguishing between purely linguistic and other kinds of conventions that may bear on the meaning of 
speech acts). 
 102 Manning, What Divides, supra note 14, at 81 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
300 
traditionally have been, and should continue to be, read as presupposing the 
availability of defenses such as “necessity.”103 Justice Scalia insisted that 
“Congress must be presumed to draft . . . in light of . . . background 
principle[s].”104 He strongly defended judicial reliance on a variety of canons 
of statutory interpretation,105 including such substantive canons as those that 
call for criminal statutes to retain the common law requirement of mens 
rea,106 for statutes not to apply extraterritorially to noncitizens,107 and for 
statutes of limitations to be “subject to ‘equitable tolling.’”108 
Adding legal norms, canons, and conventions to the interpretive matrix 
from which statutes’ linguistic and legal meanings emerge, we should take 
seriously the claim by Professors Baude and Sachs that the law typically is 
sufficiently determinate to absolve judges from needing to make normative 
choices in interpreting statutes apart from the choice of whether to follow the 
law.109 At the end of the day, however, the Baude-Sachs proposal proves 
untenable. For purposes of making their argument, Baude and Sachs 
assume—as I shall—a positivist jurisprudential theory110 of the kind most 
famously developed in H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law.111 According to 
Hart, the foundations of law lie in social facts and, in particular, in officials’ 
practices in identifying law and in treating it as authoritative. The Hartian 
system has enormous explanatory power. It elucidates, for example, why the 
Constitution is law within the United States instead of, for example, the 
dictates of the British Parliament, which once were law here. But it takes 
both close analytical work and critical imagination to explain the intricacies 
of the U.S. legal system in Hartian terms.112 
When one delves into details, widespread disagreement or uncertainty 
about statutory interpretation methodology, including among judges, deeply 
embarrasses claims for the determinacy of “the law of interpretation” as 
applied to disputes in which protagonists invoke theories such as textualism 
 
 103 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 
1913–14 (1997). 
 104 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002). 
 105 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 69–339 (discussing interpretive canons and their proper 
application). 
 106 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 303. 
 107 See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 406; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 268–72. 
 108 Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). 
 109 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 100, at 1083 (“[C]ontrary to the skeptics, extracting legal content 
from a written instrument needn’t involve much direct normative judgment. In fact, it usually doesn’t.”). 
 110 See id. at 1116. 
 111 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
 112 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1131–42 (2008); Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of 
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 621–23 (1987). 
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and purposivism.113 To put the point slightly differently, Hartian theory needs 
to explain how judges can disagree as well as agree. In offering an 
explanation, Hartian theorists come to a fork in the analytical road. For those 
who adopt a “hard” version of Hartian positivism that relies on convergent 
official practice to fix the content of fundamental “rules of recognition,” the 
conclusion follows inescapably that the law of interpretation is 
underdeterminate in relevant respects.114 There is too much disagreement for 
it to be plausible that all or nearly all judges practice the same, determinate 
rule. Where the law runs out, hard positivists generally accept that judges 
must assume a quasi-legislative role, guided by what it would be morally 
best to do.115 Rejecting the “hard positivist” option, Baude and Sachs 
maintain that questions about the content of the law of interpretation should 
be resolved as a matter of law, depending on who has “the better of the 
argument, based on the higher-order legal rules of the era.”116 Because the 
implications of any such higher-order rules are demonstrably disputed, this 
suggestion would appear to embrace the “inclusive” positivist position Hart 
adopted in the Postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law.117 
Inclusive positivists contemplate that the foundational, practice-based rule 
of recognition in a legal system such as ours might incorporate moral criteria 
to resolve otherwise unsettled questions. 
For the moment, we need not choose between the hard and inclusive 
versions of Hartian positivism to see that “the law of interpretation” cannot 
deliver the social-fact-based determinacy that Baude and Sachs seem to 
promise. On either version, a judge confronted with a situation in which there 
is no consensus concerning the content of applicable substantive and 
interpretive norms must make a morally inflected, even if not a purely moral, 
judgment. If the law is simply underdeterminate, a judge morally ought to 
do what is morally best in the absence of controlling law.118 And if the law 
incorporates moral criteria to guide the resolution of indeterminacies that 
would exist otherwise, moral considerations again come into the picture. We 
thus find ourselves confronting the blunt question of how judges might be 
morally justified in calling on the coercive apparatus of the state to enforce 
 
 113 See Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. 
Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 114–19 (2017) (explaining that the absence of 
consensus either about interpretive methodologies or the criteria for their validation falsifies claims for 
the determinacy of the law of interpretation under Hartian premises). 
 114 See id. at 115 (“Hartian positivism makes little room for a law of interpretation that goes beyond 
what is already widely accepted.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004). 
 116 Baude & Sachs, supra note 100, at 1141 (emphasis omitted). 
 117 See HART, supra note 111, at 250–54. 
 118 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 115. 
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their interpretive judgments, conjoined with the related question of whether, 
or under what circumstances, coercive state enforcement is morally justified. 
B. Law and Legitimacy 
In thinking about these questions, the most helpful frame comes from 
the concept of moral legitimacy.119 Moral legitimacy in law and adjudication 
is a hugely complex topic.120 In veering into it for present purposes, I must 
be brief. In order to do so, I begin with a stipulated definition: a legal regime 
is legitimate insofar as its dictates have a moral claim to obedience,121 or at 
least respect by its citizens, and insofar as its officials are morally justified 
in enforcing its dictates.122 As should be obvious, this definition answers no 
substantive questions about the conditions for moral legitimacy. It does, 
however, identify the laws of a legitimate legal system as sources of moral 
obligation, especially for judges who have promised to obey them.123 In 
legitimate regimes, judges are bound by their promises except in 
extraordinary circumstances. A further moral question then arises involving 
how judges would need to rule, in cases in which the law is otherwise 
underdeterminate, in order for their decisions on behalf of the legal system 
to possess moral legitimacy. 
If we ask how a legal regime might have a moral entitlement to exercise 
coercive force and demand obedience, we enter a timeless debate that I shall 
not attempt to resolve here. There are well-known, alternative views about 
the relative significance of alternative possible sources of moral legitimacy. 
One proposed source is democracy: a regime may be legitimate insofar as it 
reflects the decisions of political majorities as arrived at through fair 
democratic processes.124 Another possible source of legitimacy may lie in 
substantive ideals of justice or in effectiveness in meeting social needs.125 
There may be further potential sources of legitimacy as well, including 
procedural fairness and conformity to rule of law ideals.126 
 
 119 See FALLON, supra note 34, at 21 (distinguishing among sociological, legal, and moral concepts 
of legitimacy). 
 120 See id. at 20–46. 
 121 By a “moral claim,” I mean one about what we owe to others that is supported by reasons other 
than self-interest. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 13–15 (2011) 
(distinguishing morality from ethics). 
 122 See FALLON, supra note 34, at 23–25. 
 123 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 124 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1375–89 (2006). 
 125 See, e.g., NICOLE ROUGHAN, AUTHORITIES: CONFLICTS, COOPERATION, AND TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL THEORY 29–31 (2013). 
 126 See FALLON, supra note 34, at 29. 
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In order to make sense of debates about the legitimacy of legal regimes, 
we need one more distinction. This is a distinction between ideal legitimacy 
and minimal legitimacy.127 Ideal legitimacy would require satisfying moral 
standards that no actual legal regime may ever have met fully. By contrast, 
minimal legitimacy connotes only a sufficient approximation of ideal 
standards to render a legal system respectworthy and to justify officials in 
enforcing its laws.128 
With the distinction between ideal and minimal legitimacy in place, I 
now want to stipulate, or at least assume for sake of argument, that the 
prevailing legal regime in the United States is minimally, but not ideally, 
legitimate. It is reasonably, though far from completely, just.129 The legal 
system is also sufficiently, though not perfectly, democratic. It mostly 
adheres to rule of law norms, including those that require reasonable stability 
of legal rights and fair, advance notice of the consequences of one’s actions. 
Its procedural mechanisms for reaching decisions, including through the 
judicial branch, are reasonably fair as well. Having offered arguments to 
support these conclusions elsewhere,130 I shall forgo repetition here. Suffice 
it to say that the standard for adjudging a legal regime minimally legitimate 
should not be too high when the only realistic alternative to the prevailing 
structure of government might be worse.131 
Having briefly canvased the bases on which a legal regime might be 
adjudged morally legitimate, we can now return to the role of the judiciary, 
including in statutory interpretation. What must judges do in order for their 
decisions to be morally justified against the background of the American 
legal system? It is inadequate to say that they should enforce statutes 
according to their linguistic meanings as determined in the same way that we 
determine the meanings of conversational utterances. As Part I argued at 
length, in reasonably disputable cases, statutes will lack linguistically 
determinate meanings. To repeat, if the identification of statutory meanings 
 
 127 See id. at 24–35. 
 128 See id. at 27–30. 
 129 The U.S. legal system historically has not treated some groups, and may not treat some groups 
today, with the same evenhanded justice more normally available to others. For discussion of the 
possibility that legitimacy may be partly group-relative, see id. at 30–31. 
 130 See id. at 24–35. 
 131 See David Copp, The Idea of a Legitimate State, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 43–44 (1999) (“Matters 
would have to be very bad for a state not to be legitimate . . . . It is as if we were at sea in a leaky boat. 
Unless there is another boat available to which we could easily move, there are strong considerations in 
favor of following the orders of the captain.”); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of 
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in 2 CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 
173 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (asserting that “[a]s long as they remain within the boundaries set by 
moral principles, constitutions are self-validating in that their validity derives from nothing more than the 
fact that they are there”) (emphasis omitted). 
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requires reliance on an invented analogue to communicative intentions, then 
an invention will determine statutes’ meanings. 
Accordingly, as we confront questions about the proper judicial role, it 
should be clear that debates about statutory interpretation are not disputes 
about linguistic facts or questions of “hard” law in the positivist sense.132 At 
bottom, they are debates about how judges should interpret statutes as a 
matter of judicial role morality. They turn on opposing views about what 
judges ought to do within a minimally, but not ideally, legitimate legal 
system, the substantive and interpretive norms of which are less than fully 
determinate. 
The ideal of adjudicative legitimacy within a minimally just legal 
system requires judges, in exerting the coercive power of the state, to decide 
cases in the most morally legitimate or best justified way in light of the legal 
obligations and role constraints to which they are subject. But by what 
criteria should we gauge judicial legitimacy or the moral justifiability of 
judicial decision-making in cases not determinately controlled by hard law? 
C. Legitimacy and Interpretive Theories 
Not surprisingly, we can easily account for debates between textualists 
and purposivists as involving how judges should resolve disputes about 
statutory interpretation in light of the most important sources of the moral 
legitimacy of law and adjudication. Textualists often begin with a critical 
rather than an affirmative claim: judges should avoid interpretive methods 
that invite them to substitute their policy preferences for those of the 
legislature—as they insist that purposivist theories invite judges to do.133 
Strongly implicit in this critique is an embrace of political democracy as the 
paramount source of morally legitimate government, which textualists 
believe has direct implications for morally legitimate judicial interpretation 
of statutes.134 Roughly speaking, textualists insist that judges should adhere 
as rigidly as reasonably possible to texts’ linguistic meanings in order to 
facilitate the operation of political democracy, including legislative 
 
 132 See supra text accompanying notes 113–118. 
 133 See, e.g., Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 68, at 176 (“[U]nless interpreters give priority 
to the shared semantic conventions that make it possible for legislators to communicate their policies to 
the law’s implementers, a legislature cannot predictably use language as a tool to define the scope and 
limits of the background legislative policies that the statutory text carries into effect.”). 
 134 See Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 21, at 432–33 (“[T]he demands of 
legislative supremacy require only that legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded according to 
prevailing interpretive conventions. If so, then society can at least attribute to each legislator the intention 
‘to say what one would ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one said 
it.’” (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL 
POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996)). 
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compromise, without judges substituting their own view of good policy for 
the legislature’s decisions.135 
I have argued that the textualist project, as thus described, could not 
succeed fully because linguistic meanings will not resolve reasonably 
disputed cases. For the moment, however, that critique is beside the point. In 
defending textualism, textualists recurrently appeal to the importance of 
preserving legislative preeminence and associated ideals of democratic 
accountability in lawmaking. 
In partial contrast with textualists’ focus on democracy, purposivists 
emphasize substantive fairness and well-crafted policy as sources of political 
legitimacy.136 Accordingly, they adopt an approach to statutory interpretation 
that they believe will promote those legitimacy-enhancing values.137 In 
taking this approach, purposivists do not discount political democracy as a 
source of moral legitimacy.138 But they embrace a theory of political 
democracy that allows legislatures to enlist the assistance of the courts in 
translating statutory policy into workable rules.139 
A further indication of the significance of moral legitimacy in debates 
about interpretive methods comes from the way that otherwise diverse 
theories either embrace, or signal the need to consider embracing, judicial 
precedent or agencies’ interpretations of statutes as considerations relevant 
to statutory interpretation.140 On first encounter, precedent seems an 
 
 135 See Schacter, supra note 52, at 636–46 (characterizing narrowly text-based approaches as aspiring 
to respect or improve political democracy); see also Soames, Living Originalism, supra note 4, at 222 
(asserting that “the normative” claim for a theory of “deferentialism” that approximates but modifies 
originalist textualism “is that more expansive conceptions of the judiciary put too much legislative 
authority beyond the reach of democratically elected representatives”). 
 136 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 31, at 7 (defending purposivism as necessary to “the task of 
fashioning a workable legal system”). 
 137 See Fallon, supra note 98, at 1780–81. Even intentionalists fit into a framework that explains 
debates about interpretive theory largely as normative debates about the most important sources of moral 
legitimacy. For example, the neo-intentionalist Professor Richard Ekins constructs legislative intent in 
the way that he does—as an intent “to change the law in [a] complex, reasoned way”—in order to promote 
an ideal of normatively legitimate government. EKINS, supra note 54, at 243. Others may believe that 
their approach is necessary to respect the legitimate authority of legislators and constitution-writers, the 
meaning of whose directives depends on their intentions in issuing those directives. Professor Joseph Raz 
similarly insists on the primacy of a conception of “minimal” legislative intention in interpretation in 
order to connect statutes’ legal authority with the normative authority of the lawgiver. See RAZ, supra 
note 23, at 285. 
 138 AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 256–59 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005) 
(emphasizing purposivists’ commitment to political democracy and criticizing textualism as frequently 
thwarting legislative purposes); Schacter, supra note 52, at 630–31 (sketching a “metademocratic” theory 
that asks judges to complement legislative action). 
 139 See Schacter, supra note 52, at 630–31. 
 140 For a recent discussion of textualists’ willingness to overrule statutory interpretation precedents, 
see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157 (2018). 
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embarrassment to any principled theory of interpretation.141 Under even 
modestly robust theories of the authority of precedent, precedent-based 
reasoning sometimes may require deviation from what an interpreter 
otherwise might take to be a statute’s “real” meaning or the best 
interpretation statutory language will bear.142 But the acceptance of a 
precedent-dictated outcome loses its mystery if the goal of judicial 
interpretation is to generate legitimate results, not necessarily to discover 
purely linguistic or originally intended statutory meanings. Past judicial 
interpreters may be legitimate authorities whose decisions have a legal or 
moral claim to adherence.143 If so, acceptance of the authority of precedent 
cannot be an “exception” to the best or correct theory of statutory 
interpretation.144 To the contrary, a theory of precedent’s legitimate 
authority—if it possesses legitimate authority—is a necessary component of 
any defensible theory of legally and morally legitimate judicial decision-
making. 
Debates about judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes 
possess a similar structure. In cases involving uncertainty in or divisions 
among linguistic intuitions, courts—centrally including the Supreme 
Court—will often face a choice about whether to resolve the disputed issue 
based directly on their independent judgment (which might reflect an 
invented legislative intent or constructed legislative purpose) or to accord 
deference to the interpretation advanced by another decision-maker, such as 
an administrative agency. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,145 decided in 1984, the Court articulated a two-level 
interpretive framework for judicial decision. First, the Court asks whether 
“the intent of Congress is clear.”146 If it is, Congress’s clearly intended 
meaning controls. Second, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue,” the Court will adopt the agency’s interpretation as long 
as it reflects a “permissible construction of the statute.”147 More recently, the 
 
 141 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (“Whatever one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, a theory of stare 
decisis, poured on top and mixed in with it, always corrupts the original theory.”). 
 142 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 (1987) (observing that precedent-
based decision-making poses the question, “Why should the best decision for now be distorted or thwarted 
by obeisance to a dead past, or by obligation to an uncertain and dimly perceived future?”). 
 143 See FALLON, supra note 34, at 79–82. 
 144 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 129, 140 
(characterizing stare decisis as an “exception” to a theory of constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
not an aspect of it). 
 145 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 146 Id. at 842. 
 147 Id. at 843. 
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Court has partially qualified its commitment to Chevron.148 Justice Kennedy 
has described the “reflexive deference” that the Court exhibits as 
“troubling,” especially when an agency has pronounced on “the scope of its 
own authority.”149 Accordingly, he called upon the Court to “reconsider, in 
an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have 
implemented that decision.”150 
The debate about whether and, if so, how much courts should defer to 
the decisions of administrative agencies involves, and should ultimately turn 
on, views about alternative sources of governmental legitimacy. In cases in 
which linguistic intuitions diverge, the best argument for Chevron is not that 
Congress intended for agencies to make a policy choice among competing 
interpretive options. It is, rather, that agency interpretations—over which 
presidents have strong influence—can derive moral legitimacy from the 
President’s democratic mandate and accountability in a way that judicial 
interpretations cannot.151 By contrast, de novo judicial judgment is 
presumably less tainted by partisan considerations than agency decision-
making. Proponents of that approach thus point to rule of law values as a 
source of legitimacy for independent judicial decisions.152 
To summarize, the debate about whether courts should adopt a textualist 
or a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation is less about which will 
better reveal statutes’ linguistic or intended meanings than about how best to 
interpret statutes, via the imputation of either objective intentions or 
reasonable purposes to the legislature, in order to promote morally legitimate 
government. And this, at one level, is as it should be. Judges should be 
centrally concerned with the moral legitimacy or justifiability of their 
decisions within the role constraints to which the laws of a minimally 
legitimate legal regime subject them. 
 
 148 Among other things, the Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference applies only to agency 
decisions that have “the force of law.” See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); 
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). It has also suggested that an exception may be 
appropriate for regulatory decisions of “deep economic and political significance.” King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quotation omitted). 
 149 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 150 Id. at 2121. 
 151 See Schacter, supra note 52, at 615–18. 
 152 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (championing independent judicial interpretation of law 
as a crucial safeguard of liberty under the separation of powers). 
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1. The Too-Often Missing Issue in Debates About Legitimate 
Interpretation 
Unfortunately, however, the thrust-and-parry between textualists and 
purposivists often skips past issues that are logically necessary antecedents 
to those that the participants prefer to discuss. It is artificial to think that we 
could resolve in principle whether it would be better to interpret statutes 
based on the legislature’s imagined objective intentions or in light of its 
imputed purposes without knowing how courts would give substance to 
those abstractions. Just as purposivists need to determine which purposes to 
ascribe to the legislature, textualists need to pour content into the otherwise 
empty vessel of the legislature’s objective intent. Without such content, we 
could not resolve good-faith interpretive disagreements,153 nor could we 
gauge the likely consequences of embracing textualist or purposivist 
interpretive premises for the ultimate moral legitimacy of judicial decisions. 
Even those who prioritize democracy over substantive justice as a source of 
moral legitimacy are likely to attach some significance to the moral 
acceptability of substantive outcomes, and vice versa for those who prioritize 
substantive justice over democratic accountability. 
With the moral legitimacy of judicial decisions thus depending partly 
on the substantive content of the purportedly “objective” intentions, or the 
purposes that judges impute to the legislature, it becomes readily explicable 
why conservative judges so frequently reach conservative results and why 
liberal judges so frequently reach liberal results, regardless of whether they 
profess to be textualists or purposivists.154 To give content to the notion of 
“objective intent,” conservative judges—with the goal of performing their 
role morally legitimately—tend to rely on premises or assumptions that 
support conservative conclusions. In “conjuring up” the purposes that would 
best explain statutory language, liberal judges—also aiming at moral 
legitimacy in their decision-making—tend to prefer liberal animating 
explanations. Methodology matters, but it does not eliminate the need for 
judges to make substantive judgments about which possible interpretations 
of statutes, as mediated by construction of objective intentions or legislative 
purposes, would be most morally legitimate or best justified. 
Textualists frequently and perhaps typically resist this conclusion. 
Seeking to minimize the need for judges to make judgments of substantive 
desirability, even if such judgments cannot be avoided entirely, textualists 
insist that their methodology—in purported contrast with purposivism—
forbids reliance on extralinguistic considerations to justify a deviation from 
 
 153 See Fallon, supra note 16, at 703–24. 
 154 See id. at 724–26 (citing and summarizing empirical studies). 
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statutes’ clear linguistic meanings.155 As should now be plain, however, this 
assertion is either mistaken or empty. As even the most ardent textualists 
acknowledge in moments of cool reflection, the “plainness or ambiguity of 
statutory language” depends on “the specific context in which that language 
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”156 Any appeal to a 
statute’s “clear [linguistic] meaning”157 to disqualify an effort to identify 
what it actually means in context is therefore fallacious under textualists’ 
own premises. 
In a limited concession to the need for judges to make substantive 
judgments in order to interpret statutes, textualists sometimes affirm that 
their methodological project has a forward-looking dimension. If the courts 
lay down clear rules governing how they will ascribe meaning to statutes, 
then, textualists say, actual legislators will be able to bargain, compromise, 
and horse-trade with relative confidence about what statutory language will 
accomplish.158 
If honestly and consistently carried out, this approach would call for 
courts to establish the baseline presumptions about how statutes should be 
interpreted that would best ensure the moral legitimacy of the legal regime. 
In Statutory Default Rules, Professor Einer Elhauge proposes such a 
strategy.159 He advocates adoption of interpretive rules that he thinks would 
best promote the realization of majority preferences at the moment when a 
court resolves a case. Significantly, however, Elhauge’s argument is 
normative, not linguistic, and he does not cast himself as a textualist. Rather, 
he acknowledges the limits of any form of purely linguistic, text-based 
analysis to resolve disputed cases. 
Some textualists acknowledge the importance of normative judgments 
in laying down clear, democracy-enabling interpretive presumptions for the 
future when they invoke or defend “substantive canons” of statutory 
interpretation.160 Other textualists express wariness of the entire idea of 
 
 155 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 56–57 (discussing the “Supremacy-of-Text Principle”: 
“except in the rare case of an obvious scrivener’s error, purpose—even purpose as most narrowly 
defined—cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it”); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 14, at 
2434 n.179. 
 156 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); see supra notes 15–17 and accompanying 
text. 
 157 Manning, Absurdity, supra note 14, at 2434 n.179. 
 158 See, e.g., Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 19, at 2426 (defending a textualist 
methodology as a means to “enable[] Congress” (emphasis omitted)). 
 159 See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION 1–38 (2008). 
 160 For example, Scalia and Garner defend a number of substantive canons. SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 15, at 47–340. But see Scalia, supra note 1, at 28 (asserting that the substantive canons present “[t]o 
the honest textualist . . . a lot of trouble”). 
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substantive canons.161 But this wariness reflects a refusal to face the fact—
which textualist theory actually emphasizes in other contexts—that objective 
intent is not only an invention, but also a necessary invention, if their 
approach to interpretation is to be workable.162 At bottom, substantive canons 
are mechanisms for the construction of an “objective” legislative intent that 
could not be invented without reliance on normative judgments anyway. 
In my view, the purposivist approach to statutory interpretation displays 
greater candor or self-awareness than does textualism about the need for 
judges to make normative choices in ascribing assumptions, intentions, or 
purposes to the legislature. The interpretive touchstone is reasonableness: 
courts should first “[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute 
and to any subordinate provision of it which may be involved” on the 
assumption that the legislature consisted of “reasonable persons pursuing 
reasonable purposes reasonably.”163 Then, having done so, judges should 
“[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry 
out the purpose” as well as possible.164 The difficulty, of course, is that the 
idea of reasonableness—in order to do the work that purposivists rely on it 
to do—requires normative content. And the normative content will 
sometimes, inevitably, prove controversial. Nothing seems more familiar in 
moral and political debate than reasonable disagreement. 
In sum, there is no alternative to judges making normative judgments 
in cases that are linguistically and legally disputable. The impulse to want to 
restrict the range of such judgments is laudable, not discreditable. But no 
progress can be made toward defining appropriate bounds without a candid 
recognition of the limits of language and the resulting challenges to law and 
judges. Interpretive debates are incomplete and misleading, if not 
disingenuous, if they do not include honest recognition of the need to give 
substantive content to the idea of objective intent and acknowledgment that 
the imputation of either an objective legislative intent or a statutory purpose 
requires normative judgment. 
It is easy to see why participants in debates about statutory 
interpretation resist pushing those debates onto disputed substantive terrain. 
Judges and Justices have good reason to want to distance their disagreements 
from partisan political controversies. Moreover, as I shall explain further, 
 
 161 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
163–64 (2010) (arguing that judicial reliance on substantive canons is defensible only insofar as particular 
canons are derivable from the Constitution’s structure and reliance does not involve “a departure from a 
statute’s plain language”). 
 162 See supra notes 19–21, 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 163 HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1374. 
 164 Id. 
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and indeed emphasize, in the next Part, judges and Justices are subject to 
significant legal constraints. They are not, or should not be, politicians in 
robes. They cannot, or should not, vote directly on their first-order moral 
preferences in every case. Especially under these circumstances, debate in 
the legal literature about abstract approaches to moral and political theory—
John Rawls vs. Robert Nozick, in Professor John Hart Ely’s stylized 
example165—can seem pointlessly academic and practically misleading. 
Nevertheless, judges cannot interpret statutes without making normative 
judgments, as they would need to do in order to ascribe assumptions, 
intentions, and purposes to a legislature that does not collectively possess 
such assumptions, intentions, and purposes as a matter of psychological fact. 
III. FROM DIAGNOSIS OF A MUDDLE TO PRESCRIPTIONS FOR  
MUDDLING THROUGH 
At this point, what I have called the statutory interpretation muddle lies 
fully exposed. Most of our arguments and much of our thinking about 
statutory interpretation rely on false premises about statutes’ linguistic 
meanings. Neither our interpretive practice nor our debates about interpretive 
theory have faced the full implications of acknowledging that the legislature 
ordinarily lacks the rich kind of shared communicative intentions that could 
help to determine the linguistic meaning of disputed provisions. Law 
certainly has a role to play in resolving contestable issues. Nonetheless, 
strong claims for the determinacy of relevant legal norms prove 
unsustainable, at least on a hard positivist view of the nature of law. Leading 
disputes, such as those between textualists and purposivists, are more about 
the requisites of morally legitimate judging than about linguistic meaning as 
gauged by the model of conversational interpretation. Yet, even when the 
nature of central disputes is clarified, crucial judgments about morally and 
practically desirable outcomes are more often smuggled in than openly 
articulated. Judges and Justices need to make moral judgments, yet 
straightforward argumentation about first principles of moral and political 
theory would offend widely shared understandings concerning the nature of 
the judicial role. 
These circumstances require a rethinking of the paired roles of 
legislatures and courts within a political democracy. If legislatures lack the 
kind of communicative intentions that would be necessary for linguistic 
determinacy in disputable cases, we should acknowledge realistic limits to 
what legislatures can accomplish. Complete linguistic determinacy is 
frequently not an attainable ideal. Correspondingly, we should look at courts 
 
 165 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (1980). 
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more nearly as junior partners of the legislature than as agents subject to 
advance control by their principals in linguistically doubtful cases. At the 
same time, we should not want to cede too much to the courts, perhaps 
especially in an era of hyper-partisan decision-making in the appointment 
and confirmation of federal judges. More must be said than that judges 
sometimes need to make moral judgments. 
This Part begins the rethinking that this situation requires. At the first 
step, it propounds an “error theory” that defines much of the challenge for 
judges, lawyers, philosophers of language, and political theorists who care 
about statutory interpretation. Nearly all participants in legal practice, from 
the most sophisticated theorists to ordinary citizens, share in the assumption 
that statutes have linguistic meanings determinable under the model of 
conversational interpretation in the same way as the meanings of 
conversational utterances. To make progress, we must acknowledge the 
fallacy of this belief. But even though the fallacy is demonstrable, it would 
be unrealistic to imagine that it could be eradicated from ordinary people’s 
confident conclusions about statutes’ meanings in light of deeply entrenched, 
interlocked assumptions about law, language, and the role of legislatures 
within political democracy. If it is unrealistic to imagine that ordinary people 
could be persuaded to abandon the model of conversational interpretation as 
a framework for gauging statutes’ meanings, we should proceed cautiously 
and incrementally in formulating an action agenda. In particular, this Part 
argues, we should hesitate to advance prescriptions that would imperil the 
pillars of democracy and the moral legitimacy of democratic governments as 
most people understand them. Democracy works well enough, and can 
continue to work well enough, even in the absence of richly determinate 
legislative intentions to guide statutory interpretation in disputed cases. 
Accordingly, although this Part advocates reimagining courts as junior 
partners to the legislature in cases requiring the interpretation of 
linguistically disputable statutes, it also emphasizes the importance of widely 
shared linguistic intuitions166—insofar as they exist—to the proper 
interpretation of statutes, including those with reasonably disputed 
meanings. For reasons involving the moral legitimacy of law, courts should 
hesitate to deviate too far from broadly shared perceptions of statutes’ 
meanings, even when no linguistic necessity dictates the embrace of widely 
shared—but not necessary or unanimous—interpretive understandings. At 
the same time, courts should interpret disputable statutes with due 
appreciation of other contributors to the moral legitimacy of fundamentally 
 
 166 Here and throughout, I adhere to the stipulated definition of linguistic intuitions provided supra  
p. 280. 
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democratic governments, including substantive justice, procedural fairness, 
and such rule of law values as predictability and respect for settled 
expectations. Overall, courts need to engage a complex, legitimacy-focused 
reasoning process that this Part seeks to illustrate through the consideration 
of some familiar, challenging examples. 
A. An Error Theory—and Its Limits 
Section I.B debunked the idea that courts could use the model of 
conversational interpretation to decide disputed statutory interpretation cases 
simply by positing a legislative intention to communicate whatever a 
reasonable listener would take the conventional meaning of a contested 
provision to be. But I did not suggest that the language of statutes is 
gibberish, that judges or the rest of us should ignore statutory language, or 
that interpreters can responsibly assign it any meaning that they might 
choose. 
The reasons for caution lie partly in language, partly in law, and partly 
in considerations of moral legitimacy. Analysis can usefully begin with the 
law. The law—which we can understand sufficiently well for most practical 
purposes—constitutes legislatures as entities that are capable of possessing 
at least minimal communicative intentions. The law also identifies 
legislatures as legitimate authorities. Authorities, in the relevant sense, are 
entities that can change legal and sometimes moral obligations.167 
Acting in an authoritative capacity, the legislature “is an ‘it,’ not a 
‘they.’”168 The language of statutes matters because the legislature has 
enacted it. Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that when 
ordinary people encounter the law—in the form of stop signs, directives to 
pay taxes by April 15, and the like—they almost invariably take it, without 
pausing for conscious reflection, to embody the directives of a decision-
maker whose communicative intentions either directly or indirectly 
determine statutes’ meanings. Ordinarily there is no self-conscious invention 
of legislative intentions, no felt need to impute a legislative purpose. 
Nonetheless, I think that ordinary people, and perhaps all of us, tacitly 
assume that we can grasp the meaning of stop signs and statutes in the same 
way that we grasp the meaning of conversational utterances. If I have to pay 
my taxes by April 15 on pain of specified penalties, the first explanation to 
 
 167 On the obligation-altering implications of legitimate authority, see H.L.A. HART, Commands and 
Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 243, 243–47 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1939 
(2008). 
 168 See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 999. 
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spring to mind is likely to be that an authoritative decision-maker has told 
me and everyone else that we must do so. 
Cognizant of this reality, I was careful, in Part II, not to deny that the 
model of conversational interpretation might work, or at least could be 
adapted to work, insofar as the minimal intentions that are necessarily 
attributable to the legislature leave no doubtful questions. This adaptation 
seems imperative because it is foundational to explaining how democracy 
can work: democracy depends on recognition of the authority of the 
legislature, as a collective entity, to enact authoritative stipulations binding 
on the citizenry.169 And often, perhaps typically, there will be no reasonable 
dispute about what statutes mean.170 
Reasonably disputed cases present much harder problems. It is 
important to recognize, however, that those problems typically emerge 
almost imperceptibly along a spectrum from clear to doubtful cases. Most 
people, it seems evident, do not distinguish between cases in which minimal 
legislative intentions suffice to anchor statutory interpretation and those in 
which minimal intentions would be too spare. Smith v. United States, 
involving a dispute about the significance of the phrase “use[] . . . a firearm,” 
furnishes a good example.171 As illustrated in debates in the Supreme Court, 
reasonable people’s intuitions about the statute’s linguistic meaning 
diverged. Accordingly, my analysis would suggest that insofar as linguistic 
meaning was concerned, there was little more to be said than that the case 
was a doubtful one. It seems plain, however, that my linguistic thesis cuts 
strongly against the grain of most people’s pre-theoretical, common-sense 
beliefs. In Smith, reasonable Justices who disagreed about how the statute 
should be interpreted nonetheless concurred in their background assumption 
that the disputed provision had a determinate linguistic meaning. 
To begin to get an analytical handle on the resulting situation, it will 
help to distinguish, as I did in the Introduction, between linguistic intuitions 
and well-grounded linguistic judgments. The model of conversational 
meaning embodies premises about how people can arrive at well-grounded 
judgments about what utterances mean, with the foundations for those 
judgments depending heavily on speakers’ communicative intentions. But 
 
 169 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 23, at 284. 
 170 See MARMOR, supra note 4, at 32–33 (maintaining that pragmatic enrichment is “much more 
limited and infrequent” in law than in “ordinary conversations”). But even if the need for pragmatic 
enrichment is “not so prevalent in the legislative context” as in ordinary interpretation, id. at 33, it is not 
infrequent, as Professor Marmor sometimes acknowledges. Id. at 105 (“Given the complex contextual 
background of legal regulations, I suspect that conversational vagueness in law is much more common 
than one might have thought.”); see also id. at 108 (noting that the “assertive content [of legal directives] 
is often pragmatically enriched content, going beyond the semantic content of the relevant expression”). 
 171 508 U.S. 223, 227 (1993); see infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text. 
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even in cases in which there is no speaker with relevant communicative 
intentions, people can and do have linguistic intuitions, defined as 
untheorized convictions about meaning that are supported by no more than 
their confidence as competent speakers of a natural language that their 
linguistic knowledge and instincts—in conjunction with what they 
unreflectively assume about an imagined speaker (which might be 
Congress)—will lead them to correct judgments. In the absence of an actual 
speaker with relevant intentions and assumptions, those intuitions are not 
well-grounded. That is, they lack supporting foundations in a theory of how 
statutory provisions, viewed as utterances, could have richly determinate 
communicative content in the absence of a speaker with richly determinate 
communicative intentions. What matters for present purposes, however, is 
that linguistic intuitions about statutes’ meanings or communicative content 
can exist, and sometimes persist unshakably, even if they are not well-
grounded in the kind of account of linguistic meaning in ordinary 
conversation that leading philosophers of language have offered. 
In positing a gap between linguistic intuitions and well-grounded 
linguistic judgments, I offer an “error theory” about the pre-legal, linguistic 
meanings or communicative content of statutes.172 According to that theory, 
our ordinary discourse, as engaged in by citizens as well as judges and 
lawyers, frequently if not routinely rests on a false premise. That false, 
assumed premise holds that statutes possess communicative content or 
linguistic meaning, ascertainable pursuant to the model of conversational 
interpretation, that can be based on ascriptions of speakers’ intentions (or an 
analogue thereto) beyond the “minimal” intentions that need to be imputed 
to Congress to make a statute intelligible in its historical context. 
We may, or may not, make similar errors with regard to other 
instruments that purport to speak on behalf of collective entities or groups—
committee reports and statements by multiple signatories, for example. 
Without going into detail, I would insist only that it would be a mistake to 
 
 172 In moral philosophy, the most celebrated error theory is that of John Mackie, which holds that 
ordinary moral claims rest on a false assumption that objective right- and wrong-making properties exist. 
See generally J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977); see also Brian Leiter, 
Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (2009) (advancing an error theory 
to explain, consistent with the tenets of legal positivism, judges’ claims that there are right answers to 
questions of appropriate interpretive methodology in cases of manifest disagreement, under which 
“parties to theoretical disagreements are simply in error: they honestly think there is a fact of the matter 
about what the grounds of law are, and thus what the law is, in the context of their disagreement, but they 
are mistaken, because in truth there is no fact of the matter about the grounds of law in this instance 
precisely because there is no convergent practice of behavior among officials constituting a Rule of 
Recognition on this point”). Cf. Doerfler, supra note 4, at 982 (describing the ascription of intentions to 
Congress as a valuable exercise in “fictionalism,” undertaken to resolve the tension that arises because 
“Congress must have intentions for legislation to be meaningful but reliably fails to form them”). 
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speak too categorically. As noted above, sometimes an organization may 
designate a spokesperson, authorized to speak on its behalf, whose 
communicative intentions determine the content of what she says or writes. 
(Other members of the organization might later disavow what she said, but 
that would be a different matter, not involving the communicative content of 
her initial utterance.) Co-authors who work in close collaboration may have, 
and may be presumed to have, joint or overlapping communicative 
intentions. In the case of judicial opinions, a judge who delivers an “opinion 
of the Court” may act as an authorized spokesperson. On closely collegial 
courts, the various judges might have joint or overlapping communicative 
intentions. In such cases and possibly in others, the extent to which linguistic 
intuitions are well-grounded might be a matter of degree.173 If so, what to do 
with the uncertainty would seem to me to be a practical, legal, or moral 
question, not a strictly linguistic one. 
Putting all of those matters to one side, I believe that the erroneous 
belief that there is a linguistic fact of the matter about whether and how 
statutes apply to intelligibly disputable cases runs deep and would be 
difficult if not impossible to eradicate. Ordinary people are as prone as 
lawyers and judges to think that they, as competent speakers of English, 
understand statutory language, can assign it determinate meaning, and are 
 
 173 In some contexts, what Professor Doerfler calls generic assumptions about authorial intentions, 
based solely on the content of an utterance, may suffice for conclusions about its content to count as well-
grounded, so long as the otherwise generic assumptions are assigned probabilistically and would be 
defeasible in light of further information, were it forthcoming. See Doerfler, supra note 4, at 1043. This 
clearly seems true when we ascribe communicative content with little or no knowledge of the speaker. In 
those cases, our unselfconscious ascriptions of communicative intentions may be both generic and 
mistaken—the speaker may have spoken ironically or may have employed idioms or code that are 
unknown to us—but they will be defeasible. There may also be contexts in which specific information 
about the actual authors of written instruments, in particular, might strike us as irrelevant. When I read 
assembly or operating instructions for newly purchased items, I rely overwhelmingly on “generic” 
assumptions about a generic instruction-writer. Students taking reading comprehension tests similarly 
rely on generic assumptions about what is known to and assumed by the authors of the passages about 
which they must answer questions. In these cases, judgments of meaning based on assumptions and 
intentions ascribed to the unknown or possibly nonexistent author—if the text were produced by a 
committee, for example—might not be wholly ungrounded if there were some rational basis on which to 
make assumptions about interpretive common ground and if further information might change our 
judgments. But there is a difference between asking, “What should I assume to be interpretive common 
ground between the unknown but presumably literate and well-socialized speaker and me?” and asking, 
“What should I assume that whoever, or possibly whatever group, produced this test would have expected 
me to assume to be common ground between me and a possibly fictional but literate and well-socialized 
author of a passage such as that which I am reading?” Even if a linguistic judgment could be relatively 
well-grounded in the latter case, the grounding would become progressively less well supported by the 
model of conversational interpretation as one moved beyond judgments concerning the minimum that 
any imagined speaker fitting the relevant description would necessarily commit herself to. Although I 
take no stand on whether any particular standardized test is culturally biased, the conceptual possibility 
that such tests might be biased seems very real. 
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entitled to protest when they think that courts have erred. If so, the question 
is how the law, or judges acting in the name of the law, ought to respond. 
More particularly, it is how judges should respond as a matter of law, with 
worries about the moral legitimacy of their decisions, and ultimately about 
the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, in mind.174 
B. Legislatures and Courts 
The linguistic thesis that undergirds my error theory carries a potent 
message about what we can realistically expect legislatures to do. 
Legislatures sometimes legislate with sufficient linguistic clarity, in context, 
to leave no reasonable doubt about what statutes mean or whether and how 
they apply to particular cases. For example, I assume that most provisions of 
the tax code and traffic laws are amply clear, even if a few occasion 
controversy in some applications. Better drafting might achieve more 
determinacy more often. Nonetheless, there are important limits to the 
precision with which a multi-member legislature can legislate, especially 
when enacting complex legislation. As Professor Abbe Gluck has noted, 
modern statutes frequently have multiple drafters, run for hundreds of pages, 
and comprise a myriad of complexly interacting sections and provisions.175 
Infelicities, oversights, ambiguities, and mistakes are only to be expected. 
Even under the best of circumstances, the meaning of some provisions will 
invite dispute. Given linguistic underdeterminacy, and with applicable legal 
norms frequently proving disputable as well, judges must somehow pick up 
the pieces. 
As courts assume that responsibility, the guiding star, as Part II insisted, 
should be the ideal of morally legitimate government under law. More 
specifically, three principles should control. Complicating the challenge for 
courts, those principles reflect the diverse wellsprings of morally legitimate 
law and adjudication. 
First, for reasons involving the democratic foundations of political 
legitimacy, courts should cast themselves in the role of helpmates to the 
legislature. For democracy to work, courts need to take up where Congress 
left off in assigning clear and determinate meaning to linguistically 
 
 174 The same conclusion would hold, I should emphasize, if we were to assume or conclude that 
statutory interpretation cases differ from efforts to discern the meaning of conversational utterances only 
as a matter of degree. We would still come up short in attempting to give an account of what, exactly, 
would make it the case that a claim about a statute’s communicative content, determinative enough to 
control a disputed case, either was or was not correct. We could not supply the truth conditions for a claim 
that “uses a gun” in connection with drug trafficking either does or does not encompass the trading of a 
gun for drugs. And, given the uncertainty, a judge’s role-based moral duty would be to determine which 
conclusion would be morally best unless an applicable legal rule determined the choice. 
 175 See Gluck, supra note 49, at 96–107. 
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disputable provisions. In doing so, courts should imagine themselves as the 
junior partners of Congress, not claim the mantle of coequal legislators.176 
Nonetheless, familiar talk about courts as “faithful agents”177 should not 
obscure the reality that legislatures are not speakers in the sense that the 
model of conversational interpretation posits. The achievement of coherence 
and determinacy in statutory law requires a significant, and partially creative, 
judicial role. 
In this context, it would be fallacious to view judicial exercises of 
normative judgment in interpreting statutes as regrettable or constitutionally 
suspect, much less as incompatible with the constitutional grant of legislative 
power to Congress. To the contrary, without a judicial role of this kind, 
Congress could not realistically enact workable legislation—genuinely 
traceable to legislative decision-making—in the modern world. In any 
reasonably disputable case, arguments that acceptance of a proffered 
interpretation would violate Article I because “that is not what Congress 
said” should be dismissed as a species of question-begging confusion.178 
Second, in determining how to interpret provisions that are 
linguistically disputable, courts, nevertheless, should attach great and often 
controlling significance to broadly shared linguistic intuitions, which may 
themselves reflect intuitive assumptions about what an imagined legislature 
would have intended—provided, of course, that such broadly shared 
intuitions exist. The reasons reside not in purported facts about linguistic 
meaning, but instead in considerations involving the moral legitimacy of law 
and the judicial role. When linguistic intuitions are widely shared, 
interpretive methodologies or conclusions that too far undermine ordinary 
citizens’ capacity to identify their rights and obligations would damage the 
moral legitimacy of our legal regime. Rule of law considerations involving 
the law’s transparency and predictability are crucially at stake. 
On this point, I should note, my prescription largely aligns with current 
practice. Judges rarely if ever reach decisions that reject proffered 
interpretations on which nearly everyone’s linguistic intuitions converge. 
Reasoning from Hartian premises under which the rule if recognition is fixed 
 
 176 On the idea of junior judicial partnership in lawmaking, see Fallon, supra note 98; Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 98. 
 177 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 178 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2503 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting that 
arguments from unworkability “would show only that the statutory scheme contains a flaw; they would 
not show that the statute means the opposite of what it says”); Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A 
Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612–13 (2012) 
(“And if they said ‘up’ when they meant ‘down’ and you could prove by the testimony of 100 bishops 
that that’s what they meant, I would still say, too bad. Again, we are governed by laws, and what the laws 
say is what the laws mean.”). 
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by the convergent practices of judges and other officials,179 I would conclude 
that nearly unanimously shared linguistic intuitions (when they exist) 
authoritatively establish statutes’ legal meanings, at least in the absence of 
very powerful countervailing considerations, such as precedential authority 
to the contrary. As linguistic intuitions progressively diverge, however, my 
error theory about disputed statutes’ linguistic meanings becomes 
correspondingly more important in pointing to the necessity of normatively 
guided, rather than linguistically mandated, judicial judgment. 
Third, in disputed cases, judges should interpret statutes holistically, as 
presumptively embodying reasonably coherent policy prescriptions, rather 
than by riveting on bits of language in relative isolation.180 Considerations of 
democratic legitimacy and ideals of substantively good government both 
support this interpretive principle. If statutory interpretation is to proceed 
based on an invented substitute for a speaker’s communicative intentions—
as textualists and many purposivists agree that it should—then the invented 
substitute should make it reasonably possible for legislatures to enact 
complex statutes that function coherently in the service of recognizable 
conceptions of the public interest. In holding legislators accountable for 
statutes, voters should be able to express approval or disapproval of 
intelligible policies, not dysfunctional jumbles of statutory provisions. 
Admittedly, this third interpretive principle, which accords better with 
purposivist than with textualist theories, does not come without hazard. 
Beyond any shadow of doubt, it requires the ascription of goals, values, or 
purposes to a legislature that is incapable of possessing such goals, values, 
or purposes as a matter of psychological fact. And, in discharging the 
interpretive responsibility that this third principle imposes, courts could 
claim troublingly large discretionary authority or even—as textualists like to 
emphasize—override deliberate legislative compromises.181 But otherwise 
sound principles should not be disqualified based on the mere possibility that 
they might be abused. Insofar as compromises are concerned, a principle 
favoring holistic interpretation provides no license for overriding 
compromises where compromises can be discerned. Legislators bent on 
compromise, including unprincipled compromise, could always employ 
language that made their bargains unmistakable. 
 
 179 See HART, supra note 111, at 94–95. 
 180 Cf. EKINS, supra note 54, at 245 (“The central axiom of a well-formed interpretive practice is that 
the legislature is an institution that aims to act responsibly for the common good.”). 
 181 See, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (stressing that statutory text “is often the result of compromise among various interest 
groups, resulting in a decision to go so far and no farther”); Manning, Without the Pretense, supra note 
19, at 2422–24 (discussing Justice Scalia’s view). 
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What bears greater emphasis, however, is that no interpretive theory 
could establish failsafe guarantees against the risk of judicial overreach. In 
attacking purposivism, textualists preach the mantra that courts must never 
deviate from the meanings of clear statutory texts. But this claim, as I have 
emphasized, is either vacuous or misleading in disputable cases that are not 
controlled by the minimal intentions that must be imputed to Congress to 
render a provision intelligible in its context. 
Accordingly, to echo a phrase that I used earlier, the responsibility falls 
to the courts to find a way forward that respects and builds on what Congress 
has done, but that is not and could not be precisely determined by past 
congressional action. Under these circumstances, holistic interpretation 
based on imputed purposes entails an embrace of judicial responsibility to 
the appropriate degree in a political democracy. As the notion of junior 
judicial partnership seeks to bring out, imputed policies must fit the language 
that Congress actually enacted182—even though there will, inevitably, be 
disagreement in marginal cases about what counts as fitting once a holistic 
framework is adopted. Determinate legislative language (as gauged either by 
the minimal intentions necessary to make statutory language intelligible in 
relevant contexts or by overwhelmingly convergent linguistic intuitions) 
controls. Last, but by no means least, Congress can always have the final, 
controlling word by amending a statute to override any judicial 
interpretation. 
C. Legal Meaning 
In endorsing a principle of holistic statutory interpretation that bends 
toward interpretive purposivism, I have appealed repeatedly to normative 
considerations. In earlier Parts of this Article, my references to statutes’ 
“meaning” adhered relatively scrupulously—with one brief, noted 
exception—to the definition that I stipulated in the Introduction, which 
reserved that term for what philosophers of language call an utterance’s 
“communicative content.”183 In this Part, by contrast, I have abandoned that 
restriction on the ground that a statute’s minimal “communicative content” 
far too frequently fails to answer the law’s needs for determinacy. Instead, I 
have suggested that courts should resolve disputed questions of statutory 
interpretation based on a mix of linguistic, legal, and moral considerations. 
In previous writing, I have identified a multiplicity of senses of 
“meaning” that the law sometimes makes eligible for adoption by judges as 
 
 182 See Gluck, supra note 49, at 79 (“[W]hat has escaped attention [in textualist critiques of 
interpretive purposivism] is that the kind of objectified, text-derived purpose [that the modern] Court 
utilizes has textualist foundations, along with Legal Process ones.”). 
 183 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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the legally relevant meaning of a statute: (1) literal or semantic meaning, (2) 
moral or conceptual meaning, (3) reasonable meaning, (4) intended meaning, 
and (5) interpreted or precedential meaning.184 In my view, judges acting as 
helpmates to or junior partners of the legislature should sometimes employ 
the entire menu of interpretive options that the law provides in order to reach 
the most morally legitimate outcomes. Although I have no sharply defined 
formula for combining relevant considerations,185 or for identifying the most 
legally and morally salient sense of “meaning” in a particular case, a few 
examples may illustrate the kind of multi-factored analytical process that 
judges should pursue in seeking to maximize the moral legitimacy of their 
decisions in reasonably contestable cases. 
Smith v. United States. I believe that Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, 
reached the correct result: the Court should have ruled that a statute that 
enhanced the penalty for drug offenses for any person who “uses . . . a 
firearm” in the course of drug trafficking did not apply to a criminal 
defendant who had attempted to trade a gun for drugs.186 Although the 
majority opinion reasoned correctly that the statutory language literally 
applied, there is force to Justice Scalia’s protest that “[t]he ordinary meaning 
of ‘uses a firearm’”—by which I take him to refer to most people’s linguistic 
intuitions—“does not include using it as an article of commerce.”187 
Crediting Justice Scalia’s guess about most people’s linguistic intuitions, 
which may themselves reflect unselfconscious assumptions about the likely 
communicative intentions of an inchoately imagined Congress, I see no 
adequate reason for the Court to have adopted a contrary interpretation. To 
the contrary, the longstanding canon of statutory interpretation known as the 
rule of lenity, which essentially prescribes that criminal defendants should 
get the benefit of reasonable interpretive doubts, supports Scalia’s 
conclusion.188 Considerations of justice and fairness undergird the rule of 
lenity. 
In differentiating my preferred analysis from that of others who agree 
with Justice Scalia about how the statute should have been interpreted, I 
would emphasize only that the decision should have rested on legal and 
moral foundations, not on claims about linguistic meaning. According to 
 
 184 See FALLON, supra note 34, at 51–57, 142–53; Fallon, supra note 10, at 1244–45. 
 185 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Arguing in Good Faith About the Constitution: Ideology, 
Methodology, and Reflective Equilibrium, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 144 (2017) (proposing that participants 
in constitutional debates should engage in “a back and forth search for reflective equilibrium”). 
 186 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 187 Id. at 242 n.1. 
 188 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 296 (explicating the rule of lenity as prescribing that 
“[a]mbiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s 
favor”). 
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philosopher of language Scott Soames, “the real issue” in Smith should have 
been “what the lawmakers asserted in adopting the text”189 or the linguistic 
meaning of the disputed provision. I disagree. Absent more richly 
determinate communicative intentions than the enacting legislature (as an 
artificial, collective entity) reasonably could have had, the Court should have 
put aside the model of conversational interpretation and focused on other 
factors relevant to the legitimacy of its decision, centrally including 
widespread linguistic intuitions and the rule of lenity. 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.190 In Weber, the Supreme 
Court confronted the question whether a provision of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act that made it unlawful for employers to “discriminate . . . because of . . . 
race” forbade affirmative action preferences for racial minorities.191 Dividing 
five to two, the Court held that it did not. The dissenting Justices protested 
vehemently that race-based affirmative action programs came within the 
literal language of the statutory prohibition.192 I would stipulate, moreover, 
that many and perhaps most people’s linguistic intuitions would have 
supported the dissenters’ conclusions about the statute’s linguistic meaning. 
Even so, the minimal intention necessarily ascribed to Congress to make the 
statutory language intelligible did not require the dissenting Justices’ 
interpretation. In Weber, it was entirely intelligible to understand the 
regulatory prohibition as aimed centrally at, and as applicable only to, 
traditional, hostility-based discrimination that reflected an ideology of white 
supremacy.193 
Nor, under the circumstances, should common but not unanimous 
linguistic intuitions necessarily have proved decisive in light of other 
legitimacy-based considerations. Among the legal senses of “meaning” 
eligible for judicial adoption is “real conceptual meaning.”194 And if we focus 
on the real conceptual meaning of the prohibition against discrimination in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the English Oxford Living Dictionaries indicate 
that “discriminate” can mean either “differentiate” or “make an unjust or 
prejudicial distinction.”195 In my view, the Court in Weber had good, 
legitimacy-based reasons to accentuate the latter of these two senses. In 
1964, and still in 1979, many of the blacks who stood to benefit from 
 
 189 Soames, A Post-Originalist Theory, supra note 9, at 598–99 (2013). 
 190 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 191 Id. at 197, 201; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 192 See id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 193 For an ordinary-conversational analogy, recall the example of Carol’s “grounding” by her parents 
not encompassing church or music lessons, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 195 Discriminate, LEXICO, https://lexico.com/en/definition/discriminate [https://perma.cc/XN6Q-
MD8N]. 
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programs challenged in Weber were likely victims of past invidious 
discrimination. Backward-looking arguments suggested that it would be 
unwise if not unfair to bar efforts to compensate for past injustices.196 
Forward-looking arguments highlighted the potential and possibly the 
necessity of affirmative action to establish substantive equality of 
opportunity for historically disadvantaged racial minorities.197 Absent a 
richly determinate speakers’ intent, I agree with the majority Justices in 
Weber that the disputed statutory language was best interpreted as forbidding 
racially exclusionary discrimination but not all affirmative action.198 
Others will disagree with the normative judgments on which my 
conclusion rests. But my aim, here, is not to persuade them to revise their 
views. Without pausing to confront competing arguments, I am primarily 
concerned to highlight that the Supreme Court, absent a well-grounded 
conclusion about the statute’s linguistic meaning, had to weigh 
considerations bearing on the moral legitimacy of its judgment. As 
textualists should be the first to recognize, to talk about what Congress 
“intended” would reflect confusion. With congressional intent in the 
psychological sense removed from the picture, the relevant normative 
considerations encompassed social justice and sound policy fully as much as 
the presumptive rule of law benefit of aligning judicial rulings with what I 
have assumed to be many, but by no means all, people’s linguistic intuitions. 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA).199 The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act provides that each state shall establish an exchange for 
the purchase of health insurance, but adds that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) “shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange” in 
states that fail to do so.200 Another provision gives tax credits to those who 
 
 196 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 (“It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s concern 
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had ‘been excluded from 
the American dream for so long,’ 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), constituted 
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”). 
 197 See id. at 202–03 (“Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act—the integration of 
blacks into the mainstream of American society—could not be achieved . . . unless blacks were able to 
secure jobs ‘which have a future.’”). 
 198 Much of the Court’s opinion sought to justify its conclusion by reference to legislative history that 
it apparently viewed as probative of legislative intent. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201–07. If the decision had 
to rest on that foundation, the dissenting opinion mustered an array of quotations that was at least as 
impressive as that of the majority, and perhaps more so. As argued in Part I, however, it is fallacious to 
think that Congress had a communicative intent of the kind that both the majority and dissenting opinion 
in Weber set out to prove that it had. 
 199 I have offered this example in similar terms in a prior Article. See Fallon, supra note 98, at 1770–
72. 
 200 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012). 
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buy insurance through “an Exchange established by the State.”201 In King v. 
Burwell,202 the Supreme Court held six to three that the latter provision 
authorizes credits for purchasers of insurance on federally as well as state-
operated Exchanges.203 The three dissenting Justices thought it linguistically 
“quite absurd” to conclude that “when the [ACA] says ‘Exchange established 
by the State’ it means ‘Exchange established by the State or the Federal 
Government.’”204 But the majority concluded otherwise and in my view was 
justified in doing so. 
As Chief Justice Roberts noted, “the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of 
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in 
context.’”205 Against the background of that premise, he observed that “[i]f 
we give the phrase ‘the State that established the Exchange’ its most natural 
meaning,”206 other features of the Act would cease to function in any sensible 
way. Under these circumstances, he reasoned, the meaning of the statute’s 
provision of tax credits for purchases on “an Exchange established by the 
State” was not plain, as it might have been in other contexts,207 but required 
interpretation in light of the ACA as a whole. And based on a holistic view, 
the Chief Justice concluded, the disputed provision was best construed to 
embrace purchases on an Exchange established and operated by the federal 
government when a State had failed to establish an exchange of its own.208 
“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance 
markets, not to destroy them,” Roberts wrote.209 “If at all possible, we must 
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the 
latter.”210 
With that crucial ascription of purposes to Congress, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion epitomizes the role of the judiciary as helpmate to the 
legislative branch in interpreting legislation to make it coherent and 
functional, not self-defeating or dysfunctional. The ACA encompasses 
nearly 1,000 pages. As the majority emphasized, it “contains more than a 
few examples of inartful drafting” and “does not reflect the type of care and 
deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.”211 
 
 201 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)–(c) (2012). 
 202 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 203 Id. at 2496. 
 204 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 205 Id. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). 
 206 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See id. at 2493–96. 
 209 Id. at 2496. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 2492. 
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Legislation of its length and complexity would be made impossible, or at 
least slowed to a crawl, without an active role for the courts.212 
Dissenting in King, Justice Scalia protested that “[i]t is entirely 
plausible that tax credits were restricted to state Exchanges deliberately—for 
example, in order to encourage States to establish their own Exchanges.”213 
More fundamentally, though, he registered consternation that the majority 
had sought to “assist” Congress through its strained interpretation of a badly 
drafted statute214 when he thought the Court should have thrust the burden 
onto Congress to fix the ACA (after adopting an interpretation that would 
disable it).215 In view of the limits of language and the difficulties of the 
legislative process, Scalia’s approach, if adopted on a consistent basis, 
would, as a practical matter, leave us with disempowered legislatures and 
dysfunctional legislation.216 
Against this argument, it is not adequate to reply, as Justice Scalia and 
other textualists often do, that courts must take statutory language seriously 
or risk upsetting legislative bargains.217 Once again, textualist arguments to 
this effect tend to be question-begging: they assert that language is clear in 
response to arguments that it is not—and do so without justification insofar 
as their claims outrun the “minimal” intentions that must be imputed to make 
statutory language intelligible in context. The overreach emerges even more 
clearly when one recognizes that Congress could always accomplish its 
preferences through more careful drafting—for example, to make clear that 
what otherwise might have looked like a slip in the choice of language was 
a deliberate choice. The real issue involves the proper location of the burden 
of inertia in procuring further legislative action. That burden should lie with 
those whose preferences would be to frustrate the purposes that otherwise 
would best explain Congress’s adoption of a statute, read holistically. 
Preemption. Preemption cases present the question whether statutes 
that create express federal obligations also impliedly preclude the states from 
imposing further, judicially enforceable duties on the regulated parties. 
 
 212 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in King came close to acknowledging as much at one point. 
See id. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Affordable Care Act spans 900 pages; it would be amazing 
if its provisions all lined up perfectly with each other. This Court ‘does not revise legislation . . . just 
because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly.’” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 
134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014))). 
 213 Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 214 Id. at 2507. 
 215 See id. at 2506. 
 216 See Gluck, supra note 49, at 103–04 (emphasizing the phenomenon of congressional gridlock as 
a reality that “increases the costs” of a judicial invalidation). 
 217 See Scalia & Manning, supra note 178, at 1613 (noting that if courts do not assume that “Congress 
picks its words with care, then Congress won’t be able to rely on words to specify what policies it wishes 
to adopt or, as important, to specify how far it wishes to take those policies”). 
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There are sometimes reasons to believe that federal regulatory statutes may, 
or should, do so. For example, state safety requirements more stringent than 
those that Congress has legislated might drive federally licensed drugs from 
the market. Where the state poses this kind of obstacle to Congress’s goals, 
federal courts have traditionally found that federal statutes impliedly 
preempt state laws.218 
Some textualists now reject the traditional approach. According to 
them, if Congress has failed to include an express preemption clause in a 
statute, then the Supreme Court has no justification for deviating from clear 
statutory language that imposes a federal duty but leaves state regulation 
untouched.219 But that response is as question-begging here as elsewhere, 
insofar as it assumes that a statute’s literal or semantic meaning is also its 
clear, actual meaning. Analogously to the way in which utterances in 
ordinary conversation can say more or less than they literally assert, statutes’ 
legal meanings can vary from their literal meanings—as textualists 
themselves insist in some cases. 
As Professor Daniel Meltzer argued with characteristic incisiveness, an 
approach to statutory interpretation in which courts ask whether state 
regulations would substantially obstruct the purposes most sensibly 
attributed to federal statutes is vital to “the task of fashioning a workable 
legal system,” especially but not exclusively in preemption disputes.220 Given 
the myriad of state regulatory statutes that may overlap with congressional 
enactments, Congress—or, more realistically, congressional drafters—could 
not reasonably be expected to know of every state enactment that might 
impinge on federal interests. Perhaps especially, it would burden Congress 
unduly to expect or require it to respond to every subsequently enacted piece 
of state legislation. Overall, the effect of a narrow textualism, consistently 
pursued, would not be to enable Congress to legislate more effectively if only 
“it” could be induced or instructed to legislate more carefully.221 The result, 
instead, would be to render sensible federal legislation vastly more costly, if 
not impossible, to achieve. In sum, the Supreme Court’s traditional approach 
 
 218 See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (articulating a standard under 
which federal law will be held impliedly to preempt state law that “‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’” (quoting Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995))). 
 219 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that 
“implied pre-emption doctrines . . . wander far from the statutory text”); Note, Preemption as 
Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 (2013) (arguing that “preemption doctrine 
has been left behind from th[e] Textualist Revolution”). 
 220 Meltzer, supra note 31, at 7. 
 221 Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 51 (affirming that a goal of judicial textualism is to 
“promote clearer drafting”). 
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to implied preemption finds justification not only in good-government 
considerations, but also in a conception of political democracy that 
recognizes Congress’s sometime need for the assistance of a judicial  
junior partner. 
D. A More Radical Alternative Considered 
My argument that statutory interpretation cannot rely on the model of 
conversational interpretation at least in disputed cases constitutes a partial 
rejection of what Professor Mark Greenberg has called “the Standard 
Picture” of law.222 As conceptualized by Greenberg, the Standard Picture 
assumes that statutes constitute the directives or stipulations of an 
authoritative lawgiver that can be understood in roughly the same way as 
conversational utterances.223 Although I have presented what I believe to be 
original arguments in exposing a specific muddle at the core of leading 
theories of statutory interpretation, I am hardly the first to reject the Standard 
Picture’s assumptions about statutes’ status as ordinary utterances eligible 
for interpretation through the model of conversational interpretation. 
Greenberg has done so.224 Before him, Professor Ronald Dworkin also 
propounded devastating criticisms of the model of conversational 
interpretation as a framework for statutory interpretation.225 
Although my arguments in this Article reflect both Greenberg’s and 
Dworkin’s influence, my ultimate conclusions do not sweep so far as theirs. 
Dworkin’s voluminous writings include many strands, perhaps the most 
iconoclastic of which characterizes the mistaken belief that statutes can have 
linguistic meanings in the same way as conversational utterances as part of 
an interlocking tangle of confusions about the nature of law. Dworkin 
sometimes maintained that the best jurisprudential account would define the 
prevailing law in the United States as the set of principles that provide the 
best constructive interpretation of such first-level sources of law as statutes 
and the Constitution.226 On this radical view, statutes are not so much law in 
themselves as sources in light of which interpreters seek to identify legal 
principles that ultimately constitute the law.227 
 
 222 See Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011). 
 223 See Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 3, at 223–24, 256. 
 224 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 3, at 233–41. 
 225 See DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 51–55, 313–37. 
 226 See id. at 227–28, 243, 255–58. 
 227 See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 227 (“Consider Ronald Dworkin’s (1986) position: the content of 
the law is the set of principles that best justify the past legal and political decisions or practices. . . . [O]n 
the Dworkinian picture, a statute is not best thought of as carrying a particular meaning . . . . Rather, a 
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Greenberg advances a partly similar jurisprudential theory, according 
to which “the law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal 
institutions.”228 On this account, our concern with statutes should not be with 
what they say or mean—an inquiry that Greenberg regards as irredeemably 
fallacy-ridden—but with what moral impact they have in altering rights, 
powers, and duties.229 Whatever other conclusions one might draw, this 
characterization—like Dworkin’s jurisprudential theory—marks a 
fundamental departure from the more conventional, and also more intuitively 
plausible, Hartian conception of law as a system of rules.230 Among its 
virtues, Hart’s theory builds from the ground up, by accounting for how 
statutes could be regarded as authoritative and why they need interpretation 
in the first place, without assuming that we already know well enough which 
institutions count as “legal” and which of their outputs might plausibly have 
moral impacts. 
Although agreeing with Dworkin and Greenberg that it is a mistake to 
view statutes as utterances in the same sense as remarks and writings by 
individuals, my claims in this Article neither presuppose nor require a 
radically revisionary theory of the concept of law. In adopting a basically 
Hartian jurisprudential frame for purposes of arguing about statutory 
interpretation, I need not deny the possibility that Dworkin or Greenberg 
might provide the most perspicuous philosophical analysis both of the 
concept of law and of the nature of law within legal systems such as ours. 
But even if one of them succeeded in that ambition, Dworkin’s and 
Greenberg’s analyses would be accessible, and mostly be of interest, only to 
philosophical and jurisprudential specialists. Their accounts operate at a long 
remove from the understanding of ordinary people and even from the 
operating assumptions of judges and lawyers who view their role as one of 
determining what statutes mean, not assessing their moral impacts in light of 
preexisting sources of law. 
Law and legal practice depend for their existence on the attitudes of 
many participants, including not only judges and officials, but also ordinary 
citizens.231 Accordingly, our concept of law should be viewed, at least for 
some purposes, as a “folk concept,” rooted in and sensitive to ordinary 
 
statute’s enactment changes the law by changing the set of past legal and political decisions—the data—
thereby changing which set of principles best justifies the data.”). 
 228 Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1290 (2014). 
 229 Id. at 1291–93. 
 230 See HART, supra note 111, at 98–99 (identifying “the combination of primary rules of obligation 
with secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication” as forming “the heart of a legal system”). 
 231 See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 34, at 92. 
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people’s understandings.232 In adopting this stance, I do not rule out the 
possibility that we could have both a “folk concept” of law and a more 
technical, philosophical concept. But insofar as jurisprudential theories are 
analyses of law and related folk concepts, the Hartian picture of law as a 
system of duty-conferring and power-conferring rules better explains the 
practice of judges, lawyers, and ordinary people in identifying law and 
ascertaining its meaning. As I have said, I strongly suspect that appeals to 
legislative intentions and purposes and to the meaning of statutes—as 
distinguished from the moral impacts of legislative enactments or their 
contributions to the set of unwritten principles that constitute the law—are 
ineradicable from the thinking not only of ordinary citizens, but also of 
judges. For that reason, I hesitate to reject a basically Hartian account of the 
nature of law, even though I agree with Dworkin and Greenberg that statutes 
are not utterances in the way that the Standard Picture assumes them to be. 
Unlike Dworkin’s and Greenberg’s jurisprudential theories, my error 
theory does not imperil the basic Hartian idea that law is a system of rules. 
To know how to follow a rule in the relevant sense is to know how to “go 
on” in ways that other participants in a practice recognize as correct and to 
act with a corresponding motivation.233 Rule-following in this sense does not 
depend on the applicability of the model of conversational interpretation. It 
suffices if legislators have interlocking intentions to legislate pursuant to 
standing procedural rules and if legal rules in the Hartian sense govern 
statutes’ interpretation (and attach high importance to broadly shared 
linguistic intuitions). 
My normative prescriptions about how judges should interpret statutes, 
as presented in Sections B and C of this Part, reflect these assumptions. 
Without delving very far into whether Dworkin’s and Greenberg’s reformist 
 
 232 The notion of a “concept” presents a number of complications in its own right that I shall not 
attempt to pursue here. See generally Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. 2011). Following a definition used by Frank Jackson, I shall assume 
that the term “concept” refers to “the possible situations covered by the words we use to ask our 
questions.” FRANK JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
33 (1998). A folk concept, roughly speaking, is one rooted in the understandings and usages of ordinary 
people. This assumption makes linguistic intuitions relevant because “[i]nasmuch as my intuitions are 
shared by the folk, they reveal the folk theory” that presumptively defines a folk concept’s extension. Id. 
at 37. 
 233 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 151–53, 179–83 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe et al. trans., 1953); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN 
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 80–81 (2001) (invoking the 
Wittgensteinian notion to explicate jurisprudential issues). In a formulation that Hart cited as stating a 
position “similar” to his, see HART, supra note 111, at 289, “the test of whether a man’s actions are the 
application of a rule is . . . whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of 
doing things in connection with what he does.” PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS 
RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 58 (2d ed. 1990). 
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analyses succeed in their theoretical ambitions to transcend ordinary 
understandings of what law is, I think we do better—when considering what 
judges ought to do—to rest content with more minimal qualifications and 
repairs of the Standard Picture. 
IV. FROM ERROR THEORY TO BETTER UNDERSTANDINGS OF  
HOW LAW WORKS 
Although emphasizing the central role in statutory interpretation of 
normative ideals of judicial and governmental legitimacy, I have not 
addressed in any comprehensive way a deeper question, which my analysis 
helps to frame, involving the nature of the relationship between law and 
natural language. My arguments throughout have rejected the familiar view 
that statutes are utterances with meanings discernible in the same way as 
conversational remarks and writings by identifiable individuals. But if that 
view fails, what should take its place? Although I have no adequate answer 
to that question, neither can I ignore it. I hope it will be one of this Article’s 
contributions to demonstrate the importance of further inquiry by law 
professors, philosophers of language, and possibly political theorists 
regarding a point of complex intersection and partial overlap of their 
disciplines. 
Among the theorists who have most explicitly addressed questions 
about the relationship between law and language, Professors William Baude 
and Steven Sachs insist on the primacy of law over linguistic meaning in 
statutory interpretation: The “‘law of interpretation’ determines what a 
particular instrument ‘means’ in our legal system. . . . Language will of 
course be an input to the process, but law begins and ends the inquiry.”234 
Although I may misunderstand, I worry that this formulation begs the 
question that it purports to answer. Debates about the content of the law of 
interpretation—which Baude and Sachs depict as the ultimate determinant 
of claims of statutory meaning—are themselves conducted in ordinary, 
natural language. Moreover, for a system of law to be publicly accessible 
and thus morally legitimate, all true propositions of law need to be 
expressible and comprehensible in ordinary language. In light of these deep 
interconnections, a claim that the law “begins and ends” inquiries about the 
meaning of statutory language raises as many questions about the 
relationship between law and language as it answers. 
 
 234 Baude & Sachs, supra note 100, at 1082–83. 
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Another view, which Professors John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport have endorsed,235 would characterize law as a “technical” 
language unto itself. As they point out, law has not only a partially distinctive 
vocabulary, but also its own interpretive rules.236 Maintaining that legal 
meanings exist only within and relative to the language of the law, they imply 
that statutes’ meanings depend exclusively on what legal experts—who are 
fluent in the language of the law—take them to mean.237 
Characterization of the law of the U.S. as a technical language in this 
sense threatens to prove unnerving. The exclusion of ordinary people from 
the “recognition community”238 whose practices determine the criteria of 
legal validity and legal meaning suggests that the language and meaning of 
the law could, in principle, float free of ordinary language in Kafkaesque 
ways.239 Even if this result were a conceptual possibility, law that was too far 
divorced from ordinary understanding would not be legitimate. 
Before confronting that worry head-on, however, we should consider 
what a language or a technical language is. If a language is “a system for 
generating expressions with a specific meaning,”240 it seems clear that “the 
language of the law,” if it were a language, would be different in kind from 
natural languages such as English. Among other things, if there is a language 
of the law, it is parasitic on natural language. Moreover, it is hard to imagine 
how law, which could not exist without natural language, could take on 
enough attributes of a natural language to be usefully conceptualized as 
occupying the same or even a similar status. Consider the suggestion by 
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McGinnis and Rappaport that the rule of lenity—to which I referred above 
in discussing Smith v. United States—is part of the language of the law.241 
This claim seems clearly overstated if it assumes that law is a language in 
the same sense as natural languages such as English. The rule of lenity could 
be abolished by legislation in a way that maxims guiding the interpretation 
of utterances in natural language—such as the Gricean maxim that the 
contributors to a conversation should “[m]ake [their] contribution[s] as 
informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”242—
could not. 
References to law as a language might of course mean something less. 
For example, we might refer to “the language of the law” in a way analogous 
to that in which we might refer to the language of literary theory or baseball 
or bridge.243 But I take these locutions mostly to recognize that people 
participating in a professional field or recreational or other practice 
sometimes develop a partly specialized vocabulary or conventions of usage 
that then fit relatively seamlessly into discourse occurring within ordinary 
language. No one doubts that some legal language is specialized in a sense 
that is at least analogous to the partly constitutive terminology of bridge or 
baseball. Just as natural language permits bridge players to rely on distinctive 
conventions as contributors to and sometimes determinants of the meaning 
of their utterances, speakers of natural languages can rely on their shared 
knowledge of and assumptions about law as helping to determine the 
meaning of their utterances in many contexts. Where legal rules apply, I 
assume that they can also fix the linguistic meaning of statutory terms in their 
legal context. For example, if a statutory provision defines an otherwise 
vague term, I assume that it establishes the term’s linguistic meaning in its 
statutory context. 
Nevertheless, granting all these similarities and parallels, we can still 
ask whether the relationship between law and natural language is 
interestingly different from and more distinctively complex than the 
relationship between “other technical languages”244 and natural language. I 
believe that the answer is yes, but along a dimension that once again pulls us 
away from the domain of linguistic theory and into that of political morality. 
We hold law answerable to standards of moral legitimacy that we do not 
apply to the language of literary theory, baseball, or bridge, in part because 
of the law’s claim to coercive authority even over those who would prefer 
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not to participate. If we were to conceptualize law as a language, our 
concerns about moral legitimacy would not diminish in any way. Moreover, 
we might have potent moral reasons to object to some actual or proposed 
usages within “the language of the law.” As I have emphasized, it would 
often be deeply objectionable for judges to develop conventions that made it 
too difficult for ordinary citizens to read and understand the law for 
themselves, without need to absorb distinctively legal training. 
For now, my provisional conclusion would be that there is no single 
relationship between law and natural language. There could be no law as we 
know it without natural language. Moreover, at the barest minimum, 
linguistic intuitions are crucial to intuitions about legal meaning. But 
linguistic intuitions can often be unreliable guides to statutory meaning, 
sometimes for reasons rooted in law and sometimes for reasons involving 
the absence of a speaker with the rich set of assumptions and communicative 
intentions that individual speakers normally have. Recognition of the limits 
of the model of conversational interpretation serves as a reminder that there 
often is no simple fact of the matter about statutes’ linguistic meanings. But 
this reminder, which invites the unsustainable thought that law must both 
begin and end the inquiry in statutory cases, merely continues the spiral of 
interconnection among language, law, and—in the face of 
underdeterminacy—norms of political morality in the search for legal 
meaning. For the moment, I am confident of only two conclusions. First, 
lawyers cannot understand what law is and how it works without 
understanding how language works. Second, even though some philosophers 
of language appear to believe otherwise, the model of conversational 
interpretation does not adequately capture how language works in the law. 
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